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Over the last twenty years, cyber space and its tools have entered all important spheres 
of human lives including armed conflicts and have reached there dimensions that were 
absolutely unimaginable when the current Laws of War in particular the International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) were created. Yet, these rules designed for a kinetic cyber-free 
world are currently regulating them.  
The purpose of this thesis is to highlight the legal vacuum governing the cyber 
warfare, cyber weapons and their use in an armed conflict and to advocate for a new IHL 
convention dedicated to cyber warfare and cyber weapons. It is done so using the 
qualitative method and legal analysis of the current legal framework including 
international treaties, customary law and work of the leading instances of international 
justice as well as writings of judicial scholars and legal and cyber experts.  
Divided into five parts, the thesis firstly presents the main aspects of Laws of Wars, 
its three main regimes, their historical background as well as their theoretical 
development, and discuss the differences between them with a particular focus on one of 
them – the International Humanitarian Law.  
Similarly, in its second part, the thesis highlights the topic of cyber warfare, divides 
its weapons into several groups, analyzes their effects and classifies them putting them 
into the context of relevant legal frameworks while using many practical examples of 
recent major cyber-attacks.  
The third part of the thesis exposes major drawbacks of possible solutions of the legal 
vacuum related to cyber warfare other than a new treaty, featuring the method of 
interpretation.  
The fourth part of the thesis exposes the key differences between the traditional 
kinetic warfare and weapons and cyber warfare and cyber weapons and thus provides the 
main evidence of inapplicability of the current Laws of War featuring International 
Humanitarian Law onto cyber warfare.  
The last chapter provides suggestions of both formal and material aspects of a new 
IHL Convention on Cyber Warfare including the main issues related to cyber warfare in 





1. KEY ASPECTS OF LAWS OF WAR AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANTIARIAN LAW 
 Laws of War, a term using a plural case, includes all branches of law related to the 
war – jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum,1 which all three originate from the 
just war theory, so called bellum justum. The first part of bellum justum is created by a 
set of “just” reasons for engaging in war, in other words jus ad bellum.  
 The jus in bello, which consists in law applicable during the time of war, stipulates 
that war and means of warfare must be regulated and some basic limitations to the conduct 
in war imposed. The jus in bello is the most developed branch of Laws of War, it can be 
identified today as International Humanitarian Law and will be described further on.  
 Finally, some scholars begun to include to Laws of War also a third set of war-related 
rules, so called jus post bellum, i.e. the law enforcement and instauration of justice, once 
the war is over. 
1.1 Origins of Laws of War: Just War Theory 
1.1.1 Historical Origins of Just War Theory 
Essentially, all philosophies and religions consider the concept of war as wrong. On 
the other hand, under certain conditions, rulers and monarchs used to perceive war as a 
necessary component of keeping sovereignty over a certain territory. Nonetheless, given 
that secularized state is a modern concept, a certain consensus between the ruling class 
and religious authorities on the matters related to governance was needed in the past. 
Therefore, a theory justifying the act of entering an armed conflict or a certain type of 
behavior in war, so called “just war theory” was developed.  
The origins of its today’s form date back to Cicero’s De Officiis, which appeared in 
44 AC. It prescribed that “war should be formally declared by the proper authority (the 
fetiales); only official soldiers can fight; there are limits in the conduct of warfare; 
everyone should respect and offer protection to surrendering enemy.”2 Yet, the just war 
theory has been traditionally associated rather with the Christian doctrine.  
The first Christian scholar that developed the just war theory was Saint Augustine, 
who recognized the right to go to war to governments but not to individuals as such. Nine 
                                                 
1 Ondřej, J., Šturma, P., Bílková, V., Jílek, D. a kol. Mezinárodní humanitární právo, Praha: C. H. Beck, 2010, 
p. 2 




centuries later, Thomas Aquinas, one of the most influential philosophers of 
scholasticism, deepened Saint Augustine’s theory of just war and defined three principles 
of jus in bello as follows: “Noncombatants must be given immunity; prisoners must be 
treated humanely; and international treaties and conventions must be honored.”3 
1.1.2 Just War Theory Today 
Today, the theory of just war includes six major principles.4 First, it contains a just 
cause to enter war such as mostly a defensive, but in some cases also an offensive, action 
in the sense of defending a country’s territory or population is necessary.  
Second, the principle of proportionality prescribes that any undertaken attacks and 
their effects must be proportional to the scope of violence suffered during the attacks. 
 Third, right intention aiming to achieve final peace without hostilities and 
oppressions is needed.  
Fourth, Proper authority is considered as legitimate to engage one’s country in war 
and the governor must do so publicly.  
Fifth, probability of success must be taken into account. In other words, if a victory 
is inevitably linked to mass atrocities on population, the country shall not pursue the 
conflict even if the other just war criteria are fulfilled. 
 Sixth, the last resort rule says that all possible non-military actions that might lead 
to a peaceful conflict’s resolution must be undertaken before the war begins.  
Currently, the just war theory is not codified in any internationally recognized 
document. The newest concept that is supposed to fill in for the weak states unable to take 
appropriate measures to protect their own population and territory even in a military 
manner, if needed, and consequently also aimed at the countries oppressing, threatening 
or simply not protecting their own citizens is called the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). 
The concept is designed in the Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World 
Summit5 and described in details in the Secretary General’s 2009 Report (A/63/677) on 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect6. It is based on the following three pillars: 
                                                 
3  Burns, J. Patout, ed. War and Its Discontents: Pacifism and Quietism in the Abrahamic Traditions. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown. University Press, 1996, p. 112 
4 Charles, Guthrie, & Michael Q.:  Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare, 2007, New 
York: Walker & Company, p. 17 – 30 
5 Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit, p. 30, 24 October 2005 





“First, the State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their 
incitement; second, the international community has a responsibility to encourage and 
assist States in fulfilling this responsibility; and third, the international community has a 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect 
populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, 
the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect 
populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” 
1.2 Definition of War  
 Having defined the three different legal regimes related to war, it is necessary to 
define the key element that differentiates them so that it is clear when one legal regime 
replaces the other, which is the notion of war, more precisely the notion of armed conflict 
in the contemporary language. Leading philosophers always attempted to provide a 
universal definition of war. Nonetheless, most definitions were too broad or not universal 
enough. In the Ancient Rome, Cicero used to define war as “a contention by force”.7  
 Yet, already Grotius found discrepancies in Cicero’s definition and stated the 
following: “In treating of the law of war, we have to find out what is war, which is the 
subject under investigation; what the law, which is sought. Cicero called war a contention 
by force. Usage, however, holds that not the action, but the state, is indicated by the term 
'war,' so that war is the condition of contention by force, as such.”8 
 Evidently, some philosophical definitions of war appear to be too vague,9 containing 
no notion about the most characteristic features of the conventional war from the legal 
point of view i.e. violence or hostilities, involvement of state (or simply structurally 
organized actors). On the other hand, generals and military theorists like Antoine-Henri 
Jomini or Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, Prussian general, tried to provide a 
                                                 
7 Wilson, G. G.: Handbook of International Law. St. Paul: West. Publishing Co., 1939, p. 241 
8 Idem, p. 242 
9 See Hobbes: “A state of affairs, which may exist even while its operations are not continued” in Hugo 
Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, including the Law of Nature and of Nations, translated from the 
Original Latin of Grotius, with Notes and Illustrations from Political and Legal Writers, by Campbell, A.C. 
with an Introduction by Hill, D. J., New York: M. Walter Dunne, 1901, retrieved 14 September 2015. Or 
Jacques Rousseau – “War is constituted by a relation between things, and not between persons […] War 
then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State […]” in Rousseau, J.J.: Social 




single definition that would contain the necessary philosophical as well as military 
characteristics of war. 
 The most famous and recognized definition of war thus comes from Clausewitz’s 
book definition On War,  where he defined war as: “an act of violence to compel our 
opponent to fulfil our will.”10 Additionally, he is also the author of another famous theory 
on  war, so called Clausewitz’s trinity, according to which the existence of war depends 
on the three following features: “Primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; the play of 
chance and probability; and the subordination to rational policy.”11  
 Additionally, Friedrich Martens, the representative of Russia at the Hague Peace 
Conferences 1899 and the author of the Martens clause “whose writings represent a real 
dividing line between the period of so-called ‘classical’ international law and […] the 
period of ultimately monopolistic position of positivism,”12 defined war as: “That state in 
which men constantly exercise acts of indeterminate violence against each other; [...] it 
is private or public; the first takes place between individuals in the state of nature, the 
second between men in society.”13 
1.2.1 Currently Recognized Definition of War in IHL: Armed Conflict 
However, despite numerous available definitions of the term war, none of them 
became a universal or widely recognized by the international community. In fact, the term 
itself became consequently replaced by the term “armed conflict”, even though there is 
no official definition of an armed conflict in international law either. The experts of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) stipulated that an armed conflict arises 
when there is “resort to armed force between two or more States”14 considering the 
duration and intensity of such a conflict as irrelevant,15 which is based on the ICTY 
judgement in the Prosecutor vs. Dusko Tadic case.16 
                                                 
10 Von Clausewitz, C., Howard, M. & Paret, P.: On War, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 1  
11 Idem, p.1 
12 Čepelka Č., Šturma, P., Mezinárodní právo veřejné, Praha: C.H.Beck, 2008, p. 6 - 7 
13 Martens, G. F. de & Cobbett, W.: The law of nations: being the science of national law, covenants, 
power, &c. London: W. Cobbett, 1829, p. 40 
14 ICRC, “How is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law?“, March 2008.  
15 ICRC, “International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts”, October 
2011, pp. 7 -8, retrieved 20 July 2016 
16 ICTY, Prosecutor vs. Dusko Tadic,  Case No. IT-94-1-AR72; 35 ILM (1996) 32; Decision on the Defence 




In May 2005, the international community started to question once again what war, 
i.e. armed conflict, actually means. The International Law Association (ILA) thus issued 
the Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law during the 2010 
Hague Conference: “The Committee found that the term “armed conflict” had become 
especially significant with the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945 when the term “war” 
declined in importance. Nevertheless, neither the Charter nor any other important treaty 
currently defines armed conflict despite the fact that in many subfields of international 
law it is critical to determine whether or not a situation is one of armed conflict. […]; as 
a matter of customary international law a situation of armed conflict depends on the 
satisfaction of two essential minimum criteria, namely: a. the existence of organized 
armed groups [and] b. engaged in fighting of some intensity.”17  
In addition, the Final Report confirmed the theory of the objective school on the 
existence of war or rather an armed conflict, which says that an armed conflict exists 
when specific criteria are fulfilled regardless any declarations of parties involved in the 
conflict. Unlike the ILA Final Report, the supporters of the subjective school on the 
existence of war ignore facts and qualify a state of affairs as an armed conflict or war only 
if one of the involved parties officially says so.  
1.2.2 Different Types of Armed Conflict Triggering Different Legal Regimes  
Bearing in mind that there are two decisive features that must be fulfilled in order to 
call an ongoing series of events war, or an armed conflict, i.e. presence of organized 
armed groups and fighting or rather hostilities of a certain intensity, today’s international 
law defines four different types of conflicts. Firstly, it distinguishes internal tensions and 
disturbances described as “riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of 
a similar nature.”18  
Secondly, once the conflict situation overpasses a certain level of disturbances 
violence appears but stays within borders of a single country, the situation is qualified as 
an Internal Armed Conflict, which is also called Non-International Armed Conflict 
(NIAC).19 In practice, all the armed conflicts which do not enter any other recognized 
category (a conflict that surpasses the first category but cannot be qualified as the 
                                                 
17 ILA: Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law, The Hague Conference, Hague, 
2010, p. 32 
18 Article 1(2) of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 




following two i.e. Wars of National Liberation and International Armed Conflict) are 
qualified as NIAC including civil wars.  
Thirdly, contrary to the NIAC, International Armed Conflict (IAC) is described as 
“all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two 
or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one 
of them.”20  
Finally, the forth category, so called Wars of National Liberation is defined as a 
situation when “peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination.”21   
However, during the 20th century when states started to interfere into other countries’ 
conflicts by various means that were much more sophisticated than before, including 
different soft-power economic and diplomatic measures, the borders between NIAC and 
IAC became more and more blurred.  
Nowadays, the disappearance of a clear distinction between NIAC and IAC causes 
many difficulties in determining if IHL rules apply to a specific conflict or not, since by 
definition, IHL in general does not apply to Non-International Armed Conflicts but it does 
contain rules for protection of civilians even during the NIACs (especially the Protocol 
II). 
1.3 Definition of “Attack”  
Once an armed conflict occurs, it is the IHL, which applies on the situation, regardless 
whether the armed conflict has arisen in conformity with jus ad bellum or not. The notion 
of attack naturally constitutes one of the key terms related to Laws of War in general, 
however, its legal definition is not the same in all laws-of-war regimes: “An ‘armed 
attack’ is an action that gives States the right to a response rising to the level of a “use 
of force,” as that term is understood in the jus ad bellum. By contrast, the term “attack” 
refers to a particular type of military operation during an armed conflict to which 
particular International Humanitarian Law norms apply.”22  
In jus ad bellum, the meaning of the term “armed attack” is derived from the article 
51 of the UN Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
                                                 
20 Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions 
21 Article 1(4) of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
22 Schmitt, M.N.: “Attack” as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber Operations Context, Tallinn: 




collective or individual self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by members in exercise of this right of 
self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any 
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.” This article thus constitutes one of the two 
lawful exceptions23 to the ban of the use of force stipulated in the Article 2(4) of the 
Charter: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”.  
Therefore, the exercise of the right to self-defence does not require a previous 
authorization by the Security Council and can be used either by the attacked state alone 
or in a form of a collective defense.  
However, although every armed attack constitutes “use of force” not every “use of 
force” constitutes an armed attack, as stipulated by the International Court of Justice in 
the so called Nicaragua Case24, which decided that only use of force of a certain degree, 
can constitute an armed attack. Nevertheless, the law of war theory still contains a certain 
gap between what type or amount of use of force already represents an armed attack and 
which kind and intensity of use of force does not. 
Contrary to jus ad bellum, the term “attack” in jus in bello i.e. IHL is described as “a 
particular category of military operations”25 and as such is not derived from the Article 
51 of the Charter but from the Article 49 (I) of the Additional Protocol I: “‘Attacks’ means 
acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence.”26 One of the 
leading IHL experts Michael Schmitt explains that IHL’s “attack” “is a neutral term in 
the sense that some attacks are lawful, whereas others are not, either because of the status 
of the object of the attack or how the attack is conducted. Neutral though it may be, 
“attack” is operatively a key threshold concept in International Humanitarian Law 
                                                 
23 The other one is the Collective Action authorized by the UN Security Council as stipulated in the 
articles 24 and 25, and Chapter VII of the Charter 
24 Nicaragua v. United States of America - Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua - 
Judgment of 27 June 1986 - Merits - Judgments [1986] ICJ 1 (27 June 1986). 
25 Schmitt, p.  285 




because many of its core prohibitions and restrictions apply only to acts qualifying as 
such.”27 
In order to avoid any confusions on the following lines between the armed attack in 
the sense of the Article 51 of the Charter, i.e. the jus ad bellum regime, and the Article 49 
(I) of the Additional Protocol I, i.e. IHL, the term “armed attack” in its entirety will be 
reserved for the jus ad bellum context, whereas the term “attack” will be used only in the 
IHL context.  
Nonetheless, despite the different definitions of the term attack in jus ad bellum and 
IHL, the both notions face a similar problem when it comes to cyber warfare, which is 
whether the cyber-attacks can be qualified as “armed attacks” in jus ad bellum and/or 
“attacks” in IHL. 
1.4 IHL: Conventions, Scope of Application and General Principles 
Today, it is in particular the rules of IHL, which provide official binding definitions 
of many terms essential to the Laws of War. As a result, this work focuses on cyber 
warfare in the IHL context but without omitting the important parts of the other two 
branches of Laws of War, especially then of jus ad bellum, as they will be essential at the 
moment when an international convention on cyber warfare is negotiated. Therefore, it is 
necessary to further describe the cornerstone conventions that created International 
Humanitarian Law as well as its scope of application, key notions and principles. 
1.4.1 Hague and Geneva Conventions 
Concerning the practice of war, the parties involved in war used to agree upon the 
rules of war, jus in bello of their times, before the war itself or each of its battles. 
Alternatively, some rules of war used to be codified in bilateral treaties. However, most 
of the conduct in war used to follow the customary Laws of War. 
The situation started to change in mid-19th century, catalyzed by two important 
events: the first organized medical help provided to the wounded on the battlefield 
regardless the affiliation coordinated by Henri Dunant during the Battle of Solferino in 
June 1859 and the first formation of a code containing rules of conduct on the battlefield 
by Francis Lieber called the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field and issued for the Union soldiers during the American Civil War in 
                                                 




April 1863. The same year, Henry Dunant founded the Committee of the Five gathering 
representatives of five highly influential Geneva families to investigate the 
implementation of providing aid and relief to the wounded on the battlefields. The 
Committee was shortly after renamed to the International Committee for Relief to the 
Wounded. In 1876, the Committee was renamed again, this time to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  
 A few years later, in October 1863, the Committee convened the representatives of 
16 states in Geneva and finally signed on 22 August 1864 the Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, which became to 
be known as the First Geneva Convention: “a set of ten articles that laid down rules 
designed to ensure that all soldiers wounded on the battlefield – whatever side they were 
on – were taken care of without distinction.”28  
After the Russo-Japanesse war in 1906, the main provisions of the First Geneva 
Convention were adjusted to the conditions of wars at sea and issued as the Geneva 
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea.29 
Whereas by the end of the 19th century, the individual’s protection was already 
covered by the first two Geneva Conventions, there was still no multilateral treaty on the 
means and methods of warfare. In 1899, the First Hague Peace Conference was in 
Hague30 and resulted in the First Hague Convention concerning the laws and customs of 
war on Land. Its successful ratification process31 led to the signature of the Second Hague 
Peace Conference in 1907 and consequently of the Second Hague Convention respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, which eventually replaced the First Hague Convention 
between the state parties.  
Even though the series of peace conferences was interrupted by the World War I, the 
states came back to the negotiation table in 1925 when, regarding the events of the World 
War I, they agreed upon and ratified the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
                                                 
28 ICCR: Development of modern International Humanitarian Law, 13 May 2010 
29 Ondřej, J., Šturma, P., Bílková, V., Jílek, D. a kol. Mezinárodní humanitární právo. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2010, 
p. 96 
30 idem p. 97 






Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (so 
called First Geneva Protocol). In 1929, the Third Geneva Convention on the treatment of 
the prisoners of war, so called Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War was issued. Eventually, all three Geneva Conventions were revised in 1949 at the 
occasion of the adoption of the Fourth Geneva Convention, i.e. Convention (IV) relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War along with the Protocol I (1949) 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts. 
The last big revision of all Geneva Conventions and the First Protocol took place in 
1977 when the Common Article 2 relating to International Armed Conflict including the 
scope of application of the Geneva Conventions and the Common Article 3 relating to 
Non-International Armed Conflict, and the protection of the persons “taking no active 
part in hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and 
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause, shall in 
all circumstances be treated humanely,”32 were adopted. 
The most recent modification of Geneva documents dates back to 2005 when the 
Third Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions was adopted modifying thus the 
part on the Additional Distinctive Emblem in order to introduce a new more globally 
acceptable ICRC emblem – the red crystal. 
1.4.2 Scope of Application 
Concerning the scope of the IHL application, the IHL rules are applied: “only under 
certain circumstances (the ratione materiae scope of application), during a certain period 
of time (ratione temporis), in certain territory (ratione loci) and on certain subjects (the 
ratione personae scope of application).”33  
Ratione materiae includes almost all already discussed types of conflicts but to a 
different extent, since different IHL rules may apply. IHL rules thus apply primarily to 
IACs. In addition, the Article 3 of the Convention I34 and the Article 1 of the Additional 
Protocol II35 both define the scope of application and applicable rules for NIACs. The 
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Article 3 of the Convention I covers also the conflict situations qualified as the Wars of 
National Liberation.  
Regarding the ratione personae dimension of the IHL applicability, the IHL defines 
the category of protected persons, which includes a number of subcategories, and 
stipulates the rules for their protection. The category of protected persons thus includes 
the following groups: Wounded and sick in armed forces in the field36; Wounded, sick 
and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea37; Medical and religious personnel 
attached to the armed forces38; Prisoners of war39; Wounded and sick civilians40; Civilian 
medical and religious personnel 41 ; Civilian journalists 42 ; Staff of civil defense 
organizations43; Emergency personnel44; Civilian population and civilians45; Civilians in 
the power of an adverse party because of the conflict or the occupation of a territory are 
also protected persons46; Detainees, detained or interned47; Population of an occupied 
territory48; Women and children49; and Foreigners, refugees and stateless persons in the 
territory of a party to the conflict50.  
However, persons not entering any of the protected person categories may still be 
protected based on the Common Article 3 and the Article 75 of the Protocol I.  In case of 
the IACs, civilians that “take a direct part in hostilities”51 of course lose their protection 
against attacks. Civilians in the NIACs are protected from direct attacks “unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”52  
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Besides, the protection of civilians was also a subject of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted in Paris in December 1948. 
Next to genocide-related crimes, the protection of civilians addresses also wounding and 
torturing; rape, sexual violence and sexual exploitation; forced and restricted movement; 
impoverishment; emotional suffering and post-war suffering. The punishment of the 
prohibited actions against the civilians are, nonetheless, subject of International Criminal 
Law and not IHL. 
Next to the civilians, the IHL provides protection also to combatants - “members of 
the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains 
covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have 
the right to participate directly in hostilities.”53  
Moreover, as a group, combatants shall act according to IHL rules54 and individually 
respect the obligation to distinguish themselves from the civilian population.55 In such 
case, they are considered as privileged combatants and when captured, they shall be 
treated as a prisoner of war.56 Combatants that cannot be considered as privileged ones 
include the combatants that would be qualified as privileged but have breached Laws of 
War, i.e. mercenaries, spies, child soldiers and levée en masse57. Even if a captive does 
not qualify as a privileged combatant, s/he can be still protected according to the Fourth 
Geneva Convention under certain circumstances.58  
Additionally, even though not a part of the ratione personae stricto sensu, IHL 
protects also the environment: “it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare 
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment.”59 Finally, the Protocol I prescribes that “Care shall 
be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term 
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and severe damage. […] Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are 
prohibited.”60 
1.4.3 General Principles 
The main goal of IHL is to avoid the absolute war, i.e. war without limits that could 
be fatal for humankind. IHL does so mostly by placing limits to the means and methods 
of warfare, which are stipulated in the IHL treaties as well as in the General Principles of 
IHL.  
The General Principles are generally considered as a part of jus cogens and include 
two types of rules. Firstly, it is the General Principles that prohibit certain effects 
including the following four:61 Unnecessary suffering, Military necessity, Proportionality 
and Indiscrimination.  
Secondly, it is the principles that recommend a certain way of conduct featuring one 
major principle – the principle of precaution. 
Along with the General Principles, the IHL theory includes also some specific rules 
regarding the means and methods of warfare. Firstly, there are IHL specific rules that 
prohibit certain means of warfare namely the denial of quarter, perfidy, pillage, terror, 
famine, reprisals against protected persons, capturing and holding hostages, forced 
recruitment of protected persons, forced movement of civilians and using people as 
human shields.  
Secondly, concerning the methods of warfare, in particular the weaponry, it is divided 
into several categories according to the restrictions on its use. The first category contains 
weapons that are prohibited under all circumstances, which in practice concerns mostly 
chemical and biological weapons. 62  Even though chemical weapons were addressed 
already in the 1925 Protocol, their development did not progress till 70’s and 80’s when 
according to estimations, 63  25 states were developing chemical weapons. “Also 
problematic was the fact that many States that ratified the Protocol reserved the right to 
use prohibited weapons against States that were not party to the Protocol or as retaliation 
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in kind if chemical weapons were used against them.” 64  In September 1992, the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction was finally negotiated, singed in 1993 and 
entered into force on 29 April 1997. 
Another category of weapons prohibited in all circumstances is the category of anti-
personnel mines covered by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction adopted in 
Ottawa in 1997 (so-called Ottawa Treaty). However, the Ottawa Treaty has not been 
signed by 34 countries including the biggest state players such as the United States, 
Russia, China or India.  
Similarly, cluster bombs have been prohibited to use under any circumstances by the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions signed in Oslo in December 2008. Nevertheless, the 
most important actors on the world political scene like the United States, Russia, China 
and India as well as many North African and Latin American countries are not, once 
again, among the signatory state parties. 
Moreover, there are some restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons, 
too. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons restricts the use of certain 
weapons such as Mines, Booby Traps65 and Other Devices66. The Protocol III of the 
Convention addresses incendiary weapons67 and puts restrictions on its use.  
Even though “the first written codification of armament regulation ever was reached 
in the area of nuclear weapons in order to protect the environment against the harmful  
effects of nuclear tests,” 68  and despite numerous treaties on  nuclear weapons and 
limitations of their spreading,  the issue of nuclear weapons has not been solved yet, which 
was confirmed also by a very ambiguous final statement of the International Court of 
Justice from July 1996 and did not really provide any clear answer to the question on 
legality of the use of nuclear weapons. “The ban of nuclear weapons as such is not in 
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sight and all reflections on a generally valid prohibition of those exist rather in  the legis 
ferendae sphere.”69   
                                                 




2. CYBER WEAPONS, CYBER WARFARE AND IHL FRAMEWORK 
In order to answer the ultimate question of this work, which is whether the current 
IHL framework can apply also on cyber-attacks and cyber warfare, it is necessary to 
determine the criteria according to which cyber tools can be considered as cyber weapons, 
name their main types, learn about the effects they can cause and eventually decide 
whether it is reasonably possible to apply onto them Laws of War, in particular the IHL 
framework.  
2.1 Cyber Weaponry 
To find a widely recognized definition of cyber warfare is probably even more 
difficult than finding a widely recognized definition of war. Despite the fact that 
cyberspace was recognized by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defence as a new domain of 
warfare,70 there is no official definition of cyber warfare on international level.  
The main issue arises in particular when it comes to the relation or similarities 
between kinetic warfare in customary sense of widely recognized Clausewitz’ definition 
of law and cyberwarfare, since many cyber experts argued that kinetic and cyber war have 
little in common.71  
Nevertheless, most definitions of the term war including the Clausewitz’ one do 
not contain any notion of which type of environment the war should be led in and how 
the war space can influence the existence of armed conflict per se. 
 In other words, no type of space has been excluded as impossible for war to take 
place in. However, the main reason for not questioning the type of space while defining 
war is the historical aspect of practically all widely recognized definitions of war, which 
disabled to take the cyber space into account. Therefore, the status of cyber space and its 
parallel to land, air or water constitutes a grey area of IHL as well as the extent of the 
parallel between kinetic warfare and cyber warfare. 
One of the most well-known definitions of cyber warfare comes from a US cyber 
security expert, Richard A. Clarke, who defined cyber warfare as: “actions by a nation-
state to penetrate another nation's computers or networks for the purposes of causing 
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damage or disruption.”72 In conformity with Clarke’s definition and for the purposes of 
the following lines, only the elements present solely in the cyber space and not in the 
physical space will be considered as relevant, i.e. drones and other similar devices lying 
on the border of cyber space and conventional weaponry will not be considered as cyber 
weapons and thus not an object of this work.  
Regarding the cyber weaponry, it includes only the weapons that exist solely in cyber 
space, i.e. the computer network attacks (CNA),73 which are: “actions taken through the 
use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in 
computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.”74  
The CNA are divided according to the action they cause into syntactic attacks and 
semantic attacks. The first category of attacks is caused by cyber weapons known as 
malware, in other words malicious software that aims to harm or destroy IT facilities 
including computer networks, their components or systems dependent on them.  
On the other hand, semantic attacks do not attack computers directly but try to modify 
data available to users instead. In practice, the semantic attacks modify information 
published on an official website or in a computer network database. As a result, instead 
of causing harm to computers, IT networks or their users directly, the semantic attacks 
harm the end users of the information transmitted by computers. Both types of attacks are 
extremely dangerous, however, the syntactic attacks are considerably more developed, 
more popular and more differing in terms of forms, actions and possible consequences.  
Therefore, the main types of syntactic attacks will be presented including examples 
of the ones that have been developed by state actors and recently used as cyber weapons 
plausibly as complements of conventional armed conflicts or as vanguards of new 
upcoming armed conflicts. CNA differ in several key features including the fear factor, 
which is the reaction provoked by a CNA that caused it, the spectacular factor, which 
depends on the level of actual damages caused by the CNA, and the vulnerability factor, 
which describes the ease to attack the aimed IT facility.  
One of the most important terms regarding the CNA is the zero-day vulnerability, 
which stands for a defect in a software discovered by hackers by unknown or unfixed by 
its producers. Some hackers focus only on revealing the vulnerabilities and making them 
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public so that others including state actors can freely exploit them. The zero-day 
vulnerability thus constitutes an important element in the world of cyber warfare and 
quickly became one of the most favorite ways of hackers how to enter or attack computer 
networks.   
Nonetheless, in order to be able to determine which types of cyber-attacks could be 
potentially qualified as armed conflicts, since some types of  cyber-attacks can indeed 
effectively shut down electric grids, waterworks and power plants or IT systems 
navigating kinetic weapons or managing public facilities and systems in urban areas and 
the others that do not constitute the same risks despite their usefulness for espionage, it is 
necessary to describe the main categories of different malware and cyber-attacks 
including their effects. 
First of all, there are two different categories of CNA – types of cyber-attacks and 
types of malware. First, there are nine different types of attacks; second, there are at least 
five major different types of malware, which constitute each a different type of cyber 
weapons, and each of these types launches a different kind of attack.  
Regarding the types of attacks, the most well-known and well-spread CNA include:75   
- Eavesdropping, which describes sniffing, snooping or simply monitoring one’s 
unsecured, unencrypted IT traffic; 
- Data Modification, a typical semantic attack; 
- Identity Spoofing, in other words a falsely assigned or assumed IP address 
including thefts of IP addresses and their abuse for hacking purposes; 
- Password Attacks, which are the cyber-attacks based on hacking password-
protected user’s accounts either via bypassing the password protection or gaining 
the valid password associated with the account thanks to phishing, additionally if 
the user has the position of administrator, the hacker can also abuse all the 
administrator’s rights including access control, gaining information on other 
users, adding or deleting users or data, modifying server and network 
configurations etc.; 
- Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks, which are on the borders of the syntactic and 
semantic CNA because DoS attacks eventually harm the end users by blocking 
certain functions or directly preventing their access to the targeted website for 
                                                 





days or even weeks by sending too much invalid data to the website, its providers, 
the website’s related services or applications;  
- Man-in-the-Middle Attack, which is another level of eavesdropping, since the 
attacker does not only monitor or record the IT traffic but can also redirect its 
flows so that it passes through servers of the attacker before reaching its 
destination, or they can also directly overtake the communication pretending to 
be the initial sender or receiver; 
- Compromised-Key Attacks, which are based on obtaining a secret key, i.e. code 
or information necessary for decrypting data, are misusing it; 
- Sniffer Attacks, which focus on network packets and network data exchange 
including the ability to shut the network down; 
- Application-Layer Attacks, which attack server’s operating system resulting in 
gaining an access control to a network including administrator-type of rights to 
modify or even shut the network down.  
 
Concerning the different types of malware, despite the fact that computer virus, self-
injecting and self-reproducing malware, is probably the most well-known type of 
malware, it is used less and less. A typical virus replicates itself and deletes or modifies 
data and hard-drive boot sectors. It can also modify its digital footprint or get 
automatically attached to selected types of files. 
Nonetheless, the most of today’s computer “viruses” are actually so-called computer 
worms or Trojan horses. Worms can be transmitted even without being attached to 
another file, which increases the speed of their dissemination and as a consequence, also 
their vulnerability and fear factors.  
Probably the most popular type of malware used by state actors is a Trojan horse. 
Trojan malware is installed by the victim that mistakenly takes it for a different (useful) 
software or an update of one of the programs already installed on their computer and thus 
can obtain an access to the affected computer, to related local area networks but also 
global ones. Normally, Trojan malware tries to hide from the user of the infected 
computer and sometimes can operate even when the computer is disconnected from the 
Internet or when powered off. Unlike the previous malware categories, Trojans usually 




Regarding the concealment, there is, in fact, a special type of malware, so-called 
rootkit, whose main purpose is to hide the malware from the user. Another type of 
malware, which has rather complementary effects and appears mostly along with other 
malware, is the backdoor. When it enters the IT system, it stays there in order to bypass 
further authentication procedures and provide an access to the system to its master or its 
other malware.76 
2.2 Beginning of a New Era of Warfare: Cyber Attacks in Practice   
Even though the theoretical types of cyber-attacks or malware might still seem as 
insufficient in order to be considered as an armed conflict in IHL, in order to decide 
whether cyber-attacks can constitute a separate category not only of weapons but of whole 
warfare and consequently need a special IHL treaty to regulate their use, one should 
examine above all the so-far cyber-attacks that have already appeared in practice and 
whose creators were most probably state actors. The evidences that some of the most 
serious past cyber-attacks were not of private but of a country’s origin and aimed at 
another state entities are numerous.  
First, the costs of developing a complex system not of one but of multiple malwares, 
which act in a complementary manner, suggest that their authors can be only entities with 
a large budget available for investing into development of cyber weapons, which are 
sovereign countries: “Developing and operating such a professional malware campaign 
is extremely expensive and requires resources beyond those of everyday cybercriminals. 
The cost of developing and maintaining such a malicious framework is colossal: we 
estimate it to be around $50 million,”77 stated a Kaspersky Lab’s cyber expert regarding 
the Duqu 2 malware. 
Second, no matter who invest the large amounts of money into development of cyber 
weapons, the entity does not do it for financial purposes. Even though for instance the 
Trojan Gauss, a part of the Stuxnet family of malwares detected by Kaspersky Lab in 
August 2012, was collecting data about bank accounts and financial transactions for 
several months or even years in the Middle East but it was not used for hacking the 
accounts nor stealing the money from them. 
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Third, some of the past cyber-attacks clearly constituted a response to actions of 
public state entities or private entities having a crucial role in functioning of the targeted 
country and came from the hackers of the same nationality. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that their state authorities played a role at least in encouraging these cyber-attacks 
if not directly sponsoring or ordering them.  
The best example is the series of cyber-attacks, concretely DoS attacks aimed at 
important websites of official Estonian entities including websites of Estonian parliament, 
ministries, the largest banks, newspapers and other media in May 2007 from Russian 
hackers provoked by removal of a Soviet soldier’s statue.78  
Nonetheless, as under the jus ad bellum nor NATO framework were the cyber-attacks 
considered as an armed attack, 79  the organization could not launch its defensive 
mechanisms, which qualify as collective defense under the Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, which is conform to the Article 51 of the UN Charter. The NATO stand has 
though changed in June 2016, when its Secretary General Jens Soltenberg stated that a 
cyber-attack could trigger the defensive mechanism of the organization.80 
The 2007 cyber conflict in Estonia constituted also the first time in history when a 
state entity fully used the anonymity of cyberspace and declined its responsibility for 
officially recorded serious cyber-attacks, potentially able to be qualified as armed attacks, 
in another country.  
In fact, the practice of denying a very existence of  war or and armed conflict has  
become common since the 20th century: “The state of  war is a matter of states’ judgement 
and as such states  do not have to be recognize it. Since the Word War II, the practice of 
states shows in the vast majority of cases that the states prefer not to consider a common 
conflict as war. Nonetheless, even in these cases, the states that are the third parties to 
the conflict can recognize this de facto war for war in a legal sense.”81 
However, in  a traditional armed conflict, even though the situation when an attacking 
country is denying the presence of its military forces in certain territory or use of airstrikes 
is not unprecedented, there is always a moment when the identity of attackers is revealed 
and the responsible country cannot deny its responsibility anymore. However, this is not 
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the case in cyber warfare, where cyber-attacks may gain unprecedented measures and 
paralyze the targeted country for several days, weeks or even months but without any 
direct evidences how to convict the attacking state entity. 
Last reason why there are clearly state entities behind the majority of the most serious 
cyber-attacks, which happened over the past years, and why the cyber-attacks can 
constitute a real armed-attacks in jus ad bellum and/or also the attacks in the sense of  IHL 
and not only a tool for monitoring and espionage purposes, is their active role and the 
purpose to cause serious damages, which was characteristic to several complex malware 
systems. 
The most well-known case is the Stuxnet malware that was officially disclosed in 
June 2010 as the malware that destroyed plausibly the whole or at least a considerable 
part of the nuclear program facilities operated on Siemens hardware.82  However, its 
existence in Iranian nuclear facilities already in 2005 was proven later on. Even though 
most of the public learned about the revelation of Stuxnet, only a few of media completed 
the picture with the other malwares that were discovered either before or after Stuxnet 
but which clearly acted as its complements.  
Despite their different characteristics and tasks, the disclosed malwares appeared to 
be interconnected, acting complementary with each other, all aiming at the Middle East 
and containing parallel source code characteristics.83 Stuxnet itself was the first worm 
ever that acted without a need of any remote control or internet access thanks to a 
programmable logic controller rootkit (PLC). Spread mostly via USB flash drives and 
local networks and targeting the Microsoft Windows operational system through the man-
in-the-middle type of attack, it targeted only controllers operating on Siemens hardware, 
which was known to be used in Iran. The worm was disclosed to the public in one of the 
Kaspersky Lab’s reports, which underwent a severe DoS attack only a day before the 
publication of the report resulting in a part of the report being destroyed.84 
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 Moreover, in spite of the fact that the Stuxnet’s date of death, i.e. the day when a 
worm stops spreading, was recorded on 24 June 2012, another of its attacks was recorded 
again in Iranian power plants on 25 December 2012.85 
But Stuxnet was not the only malware detected in Iran in 2000’s. In September 2011, 
the Hungarian CrySyS (Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security) detected zero-
day vulnerability spyware called Duqu, which collected information and stealing digital 
certificates especially in industrial control systems in the Middle East including Iran.86 
Its new version Duqu 2.0 was revealed in June 2015 by Kaspersky Lab. Although the 
authorship of Stuxnet family of malwares was attributed to the US and Israel, the 
speculated author of the Duqu 2.0 is solely Israel, since it was used for spying on Iranian 
authorities in the time of the negotiation of the nuclear deal with the USA: “They 
[Kaspersky Lab] found out that the same virus had been used to infiltrate a series of other 
targets in the West and the Middle East, including, most notably, hotels where the Iranian 
delegates met with the P5+1 group to discuss Tehran nuclear ambitions.”87  
Other malwares of the Stuxnet family included Gauss described above, Shamoon 
virus discovered also in the Middle East and similar to Gauss but targeting oil and energy 
sector facilities, which was described by Symantec in August 2012,88 and finally Flame, 
disclosed in May 2012 by Kaspersky Lab, CrySyS and Iranian National Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT). The malware spread via LANs or USB disks and 
could not only monitor and record data but also take screenshots, record audio data 
through internal microphones of computers even when hibernating and actively collect 
data about other Bluetooth devices in the area.89  
The Iranian CERT learned about the malware due to the cyber-attack in April 2012, 
which severely disrupted functioning of the Iranian oil terminals in the North-West of the 
country.90 Eventually, the traces of Flame were discovered also in the French presidential 
office.91  
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2.3 Recognition of Cyber-Attacks by the International Community 
Despite the demonstrated evidences that cyber-attacks constitute a serious threat for 
international security and possible extremely efficient means of warfare, the fact that they 
are being used more and more by states and against other state actors as well as the most 
recent development when they have been gaining both on frequency and intensity, the 
international community as whole has been successfully ignoring their actual importance 
and scale, refusing to appropriately reflect them in international law.  
So far, when the international community has ever tackled any cyber-related question, 
it has been always in the context of international security92 and jus ad bellum regime, but 
the question of cyber warfare in the IHL context is unfortunately remaining untouched on 
the ground of the United Nations, being discussed only on regional platforms, namely the 
NATO and its Tallinn Manual initiatives. Even international law experts and scholars 
have not been examining the topic of application of IHL onto cyber warfare too deeply, 
preferring to focus on the international security and jus ad bellum aspects. 
For instance Michael N. Schmitt from the US Naval War College argues that the 
cyber-attack cannot qualify as an armed attack in the sense of article 51 of the UN Charter 
due to the lack of severe damages directly caused by the malware: “A recurring question 
in the cyber context is whether the damage or destruction or manipulation of data that 
does not generate such consequences is capable of qualifying as an armed attack. 
Generally it does not, for so qualifying such action would dramatically lower the 
threshold at which States would enjoy a right to forcefully respond to actions directed at 
them.”93  
He thus argues that the interpretation of the Article 51 of the Charter should stay very 
restrictive, since it is above all the Security Council and its power to authorize collective 
action that should be the first and main instance according an exception to the general ban 
of the use of force and that the Article 51 should serve rather as the “last resort” for the 
armed attacks, which according to him, clearly do not include the cyber-attacks, though.  
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He goes even further and claims that conducting cyber-attacks on civilians is lawful 
as long as they do not qualify as armed attacks: “The most important of these prohibit 
attacks on civilian objects and mandate various precautions that must be taken during an 
attack to avoid harming the civilian population and civilians. Simply put, the prohibition 
on directing military operations against civilians, civilian objects and other protected 
persons and objects must be understood as essentially a prohibition on attacking them. 
Conducting military operations that do not qualify as attacks against them is, in a general 
sense, lawful.”94  
Schmitt defends his controversial position by arguing that cyber-attacks, which do not 
directly cause serious damages to the civilian population in terms of severe injuries and 
deaths are not considered as armed attacks and thus permitted: “Cyber operations can be 
directed at civilian systems so long as the requisite type of harm is not triggered and no other 
specific International Humanitarian Law prohibition (such as those attending medical 
operations) applies.”95 
However, some of the most relevant international organizations in the area – the 
International Court of Justice and the ICRC published statements directly or indirectly 
approving the possibility to qualify cyber-attacks as armed attacks. In its Nuclear 
Weapons advisory opinion, the ICJ stated that “These provisions [i.e. those of the 
Charter] do not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use of force, regardless of 
the weapons employed. The Charter neither expressly prohibits, nor permits, the use of 
any specific weapon, including nuclear weapons. A weapon that is already unlawful per 
se, whether by treaty or custom, does not become lawful by reason of its being used for a 
legitimate purpose under the Charter.”96 Although issued for the purposes of nuclear 
weapons classification, the statement is clear and general enough to be legitimately 
applied also onto cyber weapons.  
Therefore, the question what exactly the cyber-attacks are able to cause in practice 
arises. Besides the above described malwares and their actions, the standard malware 
operations feature especially the Remote Access tools consisting of monitoring the traffic 
of the networks the affected computer is connected to, overtaking the control over the 
affected computer (including its navigation tools such as a touchpad or mouse), capturing 
passwords, making audio and video records, all communication including social media 
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and e-calls, redirecting to command and control servers, recovering deleted files, self-
reproduction and self-deletion.  
A great example concentrating the most popular Remote Access features was the Red 
October, a Trojan revealed by Kaspersky Lab in October 2012 but active at least since 
2007. Trojan written by Russian speakers was able to monitor and steal data from 
computers, network devices (Cisco), removable hard drives (counting also deleted files) 
and smartphones. The malware focused mostly on EU institutions, embassies, 
government bodies and governmental research institutes.97  
Another highly important spying back-door malware, NetTraveler, revealed to the 
public in June 2013 but dating back to as early as 2004, affected over “350 high profile 
victims in 40 countries.”98 Kaspersky Lab indicates that the malware was written by 
Chinese speakers and targeted especially: “Tibetan/Uyghur activists, oil industry 
companies, scientific research centers and institutes, universities, private companies, 
governments and governmental institutions, embassies and military contractors.”99  
Finally, in February 2015, Kaspersky Lab disclosed probably the most sophisticated 
group of cyber attackers called the Equation Group and assigned it to the US National 
Security Agency (NSA). The group had used two zero-day attacks identical to the ones 
launched by Stuxnet even before Stuxnet used them.100 Kaspersky cites: “thousands, or 
perhaps even tens of thousands of victims in more than 30 countries worldwide, covering 
the following sectors: Government and diplomatic institutions, Telecommunications, 
Aerospace, Energy, Nuclear research, Oil and Gas, Military, Nanotechnology, Islamic 
activists and scholars, Mass media, Transportation, Financial institutions and companies 
developing encryption technologies.”101 
Moreover, today, the most sophisticated malwares do not target only computers 
running on Windows but contain versions also for Linux and iOS as well as versions for 
Android so that they can attack smartphones, too, like the Mask, a multiple back-doors 
malware disclosed in February 2014.102 
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Nonetheless, there is a clear need to make a difference between espionage malware 
and malware constituting an armed attack, since a malware used only for espionage is 
clearly not setting off an electric grid or a power plant.  
On the other hand, it is necessary to acknowledge the power that the cyber-attacks 
have and set up a clear international public law framework for international community 
defining when a cyber-attack does constitute an armed attack in conformity with the 
Article 51 of the Charter. 
Regarding the IHL state of affairs, as it is being even less explored and discussed in 
relation to the cyber warfare than in the jus ad bellum regime, the discussion on 
qualification of a cyber-attack as an attack in IHL is practically nonexistent on the ground 
of the United Nations and very limited amongst scholars.  
However, the most respected international organization in the field of IHL, the ICRC 
has recognized that a cyber-attack can be qualified as attack in IHL. In its publication at 
the occasion of the 37th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society 
in 2011, the ICRC issued an article including a stance on cyber-attacks and the possibility to 
qualify them as armed attacks: “Cyber operations by means of viruses, worms, etc., that result 
in physical damage to persons, or damage to objects that goes beyond the computer program 
or data attacked could be qualified as ‘acts of violence’, i.e. as an attack in the sense of IHL. 
[… However,] cyber operations do not fall within the definition of ‘attack’ as long as they do 
not result in physical destruction or when its effects are reversible.”103  
The ICRC also underlined that “the fact that a cyber-operation does not lead to the 
destruction of an attacked object is also irrelevant.”104  Regarding the qualification of cyber-
attacks as armed attacks according to the level of destruction or damages they cause, the 
IRCRC stated that: “Pursuant to article 52 (2) of Additional Protocol I, […]the definition 
implies that it is immaterial whether an object is disabled through destruction or in any other 
way.”105 
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3. DRAWBACKS OF APPLYING THE CURRENT LAWS OF WAR ON CYBER 
WARFARE  
In regard to the new type of warfare, in particular its more and more developed forms 
and rising popularity, the international community, or at least some of its members, along 
with international law experts begun to look for options how to include cyber warfare into 
the Laws of War.  
As a result, and possibly also the easiest solution, the current mainstream opinion on 
the legal rules applicable to cyber warfare is that the currently valid Laws of War, 
especially the IHL Conventions, apply to cyber warfare and cyber weapons accordingly. 
Notwithstanding the lack of any agreement amongst the international community on 
such approach, let alone the lack of existence of any official document that would set 
rules which authority or according to which parameters the IHL Conventions should be 
interpreted when applied on cyber warfare, some interpretation efforts have already 
started on regional levels and amongst legal scholars. 
The following chapter will therefore describe these efforts and point out their 
shortcomings and limits in the purpose to prove that a mere (re)interpretation of current 
IHL conventions cannot constitute an efficient solution to the implementation of cyber 
warfare into the IHL framework featuring the shortcomings of the main IHL principles 
when confronted with the nature of cyber-attacks, the insufficient level of legitimacy of 
the authorities interpreting the IHL and consequently a possible lack of respect and law 
enforcement of their outcomes by the international community as well as the severe 
discrepancies in the so-far efforts of legal scholars to apply the current Laws of War rules 
onto cyber-attacks. 
3.1 General Drawbacks of  Applying the Laws of War on Cyber Warfare by 
the Method of Judicial Interpretation 
Regarding all the challenges of legal interpretation connected to the current IHL 
principles written for kinetic warfare, one could think of having them interpreted by the 
institutions dedicated to international justice. However, there are several main reasons 
why a judicial interpretation of IHL Conventions for the cases of cyber warfare would 
not be enough. 
 First of all, there is undeniable disproportion of the authority of legal scholars to the 




of states, especially in the issues of a high importance, let alone Laws of War, which is 
definitely the case of cyber warfare.  
In fact, all three branches of Laws of War heavily rely on consensus of the whole 
international community. First, in jus ad bellum, which includes the maintaining of peace 
and the right of self-defense featuring Article 2(4), Article 24 and 25, Chapter VII and 
Article 51, it is only either a Security-Council resolution or the consensus of Member 
States in the UN General Assembly, which dispose with the legitimacy of the 
international community, even though the latter does not even have a binding effect. 
There is a parallel situation in jus in bello, i.e. IHL, where the legitimacy lies in the 
Conventions signed and ratified by the majority of countries. Lastly, in jus post bellum 
i.e. International Criminal Law, the legitimacy is very fragile and is effective only when 
established ad hoc. Thus, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda can be overall judged as bringing 
positive results in terms of interpreting the IHL and war crimes in particular. 
Additionally, the concept of an obligatory globally universal jurisdiction itself is 
heavily contested up to nowadays and even in the matters of grave breaches of IHL 
instaured by the 1949 Geneva Conventions: “Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 have not 
only defined grave breaches (Articles 50/I, 51/II, 130/III, 147/IV) and provided for their 
investigation and prosecution, but set up also the obligatory universal jurisdiction of 
States Parties with respect to the grave breaches (Articles 49/I, 50/II, 129/III, 146/IV). It 
is a kind of paradox that in 2009, after 60 years from the adoption of the Geneva 
Conventions, the universal jurisdiction is perceived, by a number of States, mostly 
developing States, as being problematic. As evidence, there is a recent proposal of the 
African Union leading to the adoption the adoption the UN General Assembly resolution 
on “The scope of application of the principle of universal jurisdiction.”106 
Taking into account the character of cyber warfare, there are two possible situations 
when bodies of international justice could intervene and help establish new customary 
law related to cyber warfare. Firstly, shall the question of cyber warfare be treated a  priori 
to a major cyber-attack causing massive atrocities, the International Court of Justice could 
issue an advisory opinion on cyber warfare upon obtaining related questions referred by 
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authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies or theoretically also when 
judging a legal dispute submitted to it by the United Nations Member States.  
Secondly, in certain post bellum cases related to cyber warfare – cases when cyber-
attacks would cause major atrocities, it could be the International Criminal Court that 
would help create the international legal framework for cyber warfare, if applicable (i.e. 
prosecution of individuals for the international crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and theoretically crimes of aggression, provided that the national 
jurisdiction cannot or does not have the will to do so).  
However, the option that it would be one of the international justice institutions that 
would provide an interpretation of cyber-attacks for Laws of War including the IHL and 
international criminal law is highly improbable for three main reasons.  
Firstly, the cyber-attack would have to be of a great measure and consequences, which 
would be publicly revealed. Secondly, the institutions of international justice, depending 
on their jurisdiction, can resolve disputes either between States or judge individuals but 
none of them can solve cases between a state and a non-state actor, which is, however, 
one of major potential author of offensive cyber-attacks. Thirdly, the author of the 
atrocities, in other words the accused parties, should be known, which is not that easy in 
the context of the cyber warfare.  
Besides, there have been already some serious issues with recognizing legitimacy of 
some international justice bodies in the past. For instance, the USA withdrew from the 
ICJ’s general jurisdiction and decided to obey it only on ad hoc basis after the Nicaragua 
vs. United States case in 1986. Moreover, the difficulties connected to enforcing 
judgements of international justice institutions are often embodied in the rules of the 
functioning of the international community. 
For example, the ICJ cannot enforce its rulings but it is the Security Council that has 
the authorization to do so, which would not make future ICJ decisions issued in the 
context of cyber warfare extremely legitimate in the eyes of the members of international 
community that are not members of the Security Council regarding the fact that they have 
not even agreed to any underlining principles, which would govern the domain of cyber 
warfare. 
Concerning the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the general legitimacy of its 
jurisdiction, it is equally questionable given the fact that the largest world powers 




or some of them not even signed the Rome Statue, which constitutes the ICC’s founding 
document. What is more, both the ad hoc established international criminal courts and 
tribunals and the universal ICC with general jurisdiction have interpreted IHL rules in the 
context of crimes and weaponry the IHL Conventions were written for.  
If the biggest powers of this world were not even able to recognize legitimacy of the 
ICC because of its general jurisdiction but with well-known and clearly defined scope of 
the type of situations and objects the rules should be applied to, it is highly doubtful that 
they would recognize legitimacy to interpret the currently binding IHL Conventions upon 
a completely new type of warfare to the ICC or a similar body of international justice. 
Finally, there is also a belief that a new Convention on cyber warfare is not needed 
now because a new set of rules of cyber warfare should be created via establishing new 
customs of IHL a posteriori.  
However, such a stance presumes that the world should wait for a series of cyber-
attacks that would cause damages on the level of massive atrocities and then wait how 
those cyber-attacks would be solved by the international community in conformity with 
Marten’s clause.  
Nonetheless, it might be extremely dangerous to just wait while twiddling our thumbs 
and not considering the eventual aftermath and the price of such a waiting period, which 
would be extremely hazardous regarding all possible hostilities, damages, including 
major loss of human lives especially in parallel to the use of nuclear weapons at the end 
of the World War II when no international law regulations applied to them. 
3.2 Drawbacks of the Method of Interpretation Specific to the IHL 
Conventions  
There are several reasons why the method of interpreting the current IHL conventions 
will not be able to work in practice, namely because of the issue of applying the current 
underlying IHL principles including the classification of cyber weapons, as well as the 
obstacles in applying the principles of military necessity and proportionality onto cyber 
warfare. 
Secondly, there is a rather technical issue related to cyber warfare that would be 
difficult to be judged by anybody else than the whole international community in the form 
of a new binding document, therefore a new IHL Convention, which is the question of 




Regarding their relative easiness to get out of control even in cases when they are 
precisely targeted and a possible chain reaction of unpredictable actions they could launch 
and which would be absolutely unanticipated by their producers, cyber weapons might be 
possibly qualified as blind weapons that are “incapable of distinguishing between 
civilians and military targets.”107   
As such, they could be de facto banned by the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons: “States must never make civilians the object of attack and must consequently 
never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military 
targets”108 on the basis of one of the underlining rules of IHL, the protection of civilian 
population and civilian objects. 
Unlike a kinetic attack, which can also cause unwanted damages or even life losses 
in case of a bad or imprecise targeting or just due to an extremely increased density or 
mixture of civilians and military objects, a cyber-attack targeted purely and precisely on 
military objects can have truly unthinkable consequences on civilian objects and lives due 
to the networks shared by civilians and armed forces.  
For example, the US military communication passes in general via civil computer 
networks making them a possible target for cyber-attacks.109 
But the principle of the protection of civilian population is not the only issue, which 
could not be solved only via interpretation by an international justice authority. There are 
also the principles of military necessity and proportionality, which pose serious IHL 
dilemma.  
For instance, if cyber weapons were fully recognized as means of warfare, the 
situations where the principle of proportionality would require the use of kinetic weapons 
as a response to an attack by cyber weapons could occur.  
However, the large scale of actions and effects that cyber-attacks can have and the 
constantly growing speed of their development would make any decision taken in this 
regard by any single authority and not the international community highly challengeable 
by all the disagreeing countries.  
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Moreover, in case of aggressive cyber-attacks, the principle of military necessity 
would become highly challengeable, too. States could indeed consider as necessary even 
a severe kinetic response to a “mere” cyber-attack, since they are evaluating the 
importance of their cyber networks much higher now than in the past, the US strategy of 
cyber security pointed out already in 2003: “Cyberspace is their nervous system – the 
control system of our country.”110 
Plus, the principles of proportionality and military necessity could be also challenged 
in the case of a cyber-attack’s domino effect of an unattended scale. A good example of 
unwanted overreaching negative impacts on the civilian population could be the case of 
the attack on the Iraqi electric grid from the Gulf War in 1990 - 1991.  
Even though it was a kinetic attack that caused a massive supply cut-off from 
electricity not only to the military controlled networks but also to the Iraqi civilians 
including electricity cuts in hospitals, power plants, and emergency systems, it is realistic 
to imagine a cyber-attack of the same nature causing the same or even more severe 
unintentional side-effects.111  
A very similar case happened in spring 1999 during the war in Yugoslavia when 
NATO’s forces during the Operation Allied Force hit Serbian electrical transformers, 
which resulted not only in damaging Serbian power facilities but also in cut-offs of many 
civilians from water supplies and in a shutdown of many gas stations.112 
3.3 Shortcomings of the Tallinn Manual 
The absence of a clear consensus of majority of the subjects of international law will 
always deeply undermine the respect of newly created rules of international law in the 
future, since despite the Article 38(1)(d) of the International Court of Justice Statute, 
which states that the “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations” as one of the “subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law” in 
international public law, it is the will of its authors, the states, that enjoys the highest 
respect of legal rules, since the states are subjects to their own rules.113 
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Currently, the sole document on the inclusion of cyber warfare into the IHL 
framework, which could be qualified as the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, is the Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare.  
Written in three years (2009 – 2012) and published in April 2013 by the Cambridge 
University Press, it constitutes an academic analysis of possible application of 
international public law, especially the Laws of War featuring IHL, onto cyber warfare 
and cyber armed conflicts. The Tallinn Manual, bearing the name of the city where the 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CDCOE) is located, was 
written by a group of twenty independent legal scholars and practitioners in the field of 
cyber law that were convened by the CDCOE to give their qualified opinions on the issue 
of application of the Laws of War on cyber warfare. 
Despite its NATO sponsorship, which will forever constitute an unsurmountable 
obstacle in becoming widely recognized by the most of international community, its 
academic contributions to the global debate on cyber warfare as well as to the laws-of-
war theory are indeed undeniable. Above all, the Tallinn Manual constitutes the first effort 
of the kind, moreover gathering two main types of experts in the field – both legal scholars 
and practitioners, and as such constitutes an extremely important first step regarding cyber 
warfare and international law, which can be considered as the first preparatory work for 
a future convention on cyber warfare.  
However, as it did not encourage any efforts to conclude a new international 
convention on cyber warfare, since it concluded with the stance that the current IHL 
Conventions and other internationally recognized provisions of Laws of War could be 
satisfyingly applied also on cyber weapons and warfare.  
By pointing out its main detriments, it will be demonstrated that the Manual does not 
establish a sufficient legal tool, which could successfully cover the use of cyber warfare 
by the IHL and thus become generally respected IHL source for the matters of cyber 
warfare and as such enforced by the international community when appropriate. 
First of all, since its creation, the Tallinn Manual was directly initiated and sponsored 
by NATO and as such can be always accused of being biased in favor of the USA and 
other members of the North-Atlantic Alliance and therefore never receive a full 




Moreover, the opposing countries could also (successfully) argue that the 
establishment of the International Group of Experts and publication of the Manual was 
politically motivated and as such that their findings were, if not directly decided before 
the work of the IGE even started, then at least pre-defined beforehand. 
 Therefore, even though the main task of the International Group of Experts was to 
determine whether the current IHL rules could be applied also on the cyber-attacks, it was 
beforehand clear that the Group of Experts’ answer would be “yes” – for the sakes of 
defending the political stability and interests of the main NATO Member States, which 
dispose of probably the most developed cyber weaponry in the world. Since, if the Tallinn 
Manual had concluded that it was not possible to apply the IHL rules on the cyber warfare, 
then there would have appeared a quasi-ultimate legal vacuum, in other words, the experts 
would have officially recognized the currently prevailing “complete chaos”, which was 
not the aim of its sponsors. 
3.3.1 Qualification of Cyber-Attacks in Tallinn Manual 
Concerning the content, the Tallinn Manual deals primarily with the legal questions 
from both jus ad bellum and IHL regimes.  
The first part of the Manual is dedicated to the questions of state sovereignty and its 
responsibility for its IT networks and other facilities. One of the most important 
conclusions of its first Chapter are rules 7 and 8 on acknowledging responsibility for a 
cyber-attack to a state: “The mere fact that a cyber operation has been launched or 
otherwise originates from governmental cyber infrastructure is not sufficient evidence for 
attributing the operation to that State but is an indication that the State in question is 
associated with the operation. […] The fact that a cyber operation has been routed via 
the cyber infrastructure located in a State is not sufficient evidence for attributing the 
operation to that State;”114 and rule 9 recognizing that a cyber-attack can provoke and 
justify defensive countermeasures by the affected country: “A State injured by an 
internationally wrongful act may resort to proportionate countermeasures, including 
cyber countermeasures, against the responsible State.”115  
It is also important to notice the use of the term “proportionality” in the rule 9, which 
is de facto a direct reference to IHL rules described in details in the commentaries of Rule 
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14: “A use of force involving cyber operations undertaken by a State in the exercise of its 
right of self-defense must be necessary and proportionate.”116 
Regarding the purely jus ad bellum questions, firstly the one on the possibility to 
qualify cyber-attacks as a use of force, rule 10 says that it is possible: “when its scale and 
effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of a use of force”117 
and provides a non-exhaustive list of criteria how to judge this level.  
However, practically no real example of a CNA has been addressed with an exception 
of the DoS attack, which is questionably qualified as insufficient to be considered as a 
use of force: “As an example, a highly invasive operation that causes only inconvenience 
such as temporary denial of service is unlikely to be classified as a use of force.”118  
Yet, practical results of massive DoS attacks especially against a country with highly 
developed online government system but poor back-up system could be equal to a 
situation when the country’s governmental buildings were bombed and thus unable to 
provide their services to its citizens for weeks.  
Secondly, concerning the Article 51 of the Charter on the states’ right to self-defense, 
the Manual provides the same answer as to the question of the use of force: “Whether a 
cyber operation constitutes an armed attack depends on its scale and effects,”119 adding 
that if it does, the affected state can use its right to self-defense: “A State that is the target 
of a cyber operation that rises to the level of an armed attack may exercise its inherent 
right of self-defence.”120  
The Rule 15 provides more details regarding the timing of self-defense operations: 
“The right to use force in self-defence arises if a cyber armed attack occurs or is 
imminent. It is further subject to a requirement of immediacy.”121 Additionally, the Rule 
16 provides that the right of self-defense may be exercised collectively “at the request of 
the victim-State and within the scope of the request”122. 
Thirdly, on the Security Council, the Manual basically recognizes all of its current 
powers in relation to the cyber warfare. For instance, its Rule 18 states that the Security 
Council may authorize use of cyber operations and other cyber measures and that Security 
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Council may also grant a mandate or an authorization to conduct cyber operations with 
international organizations, arrangements, agencies and other regional organizations.123 
Finally, the conclusions of the Tallinn Manual on the application of the specific rules 
of IHL on cyber warfare will be mentioned further on along with their detailed discussion 
in the Chapter 4. 
3.3.2 Lack of Answers to the Quintessential Issues 
Although the Tallinn manual provides numerous answers, especially the answer to 
the question of whether current IHL can be applied to cyber-attacks, while careful 
reading, there are more additional answers asked than questions responded. For instance, 
the formulations of responses on some of the most important questions examined in the 
Manual are so vague that they in reality do not provide any clear answers.  
A good example is the Rule 6 on Legal Responsibility of States for the cyber-attacks: 
“A State bears international legal responsibility for a cyber operation attributable to it 
and which constitutes a breach of an international obligation.”124 The term “attributable” 
is very vague as it in fact includes also the situation of mere speculations about the 
originator of the attack. 
In some cases, it directly acknowledges that majority of the participating experts were 
not able to agree upon a unique position: “The case of actions that do not result in injury, 
death, damage, or destruction, but which otherwise have extensive negative effects, is 
unsettled; […] the classic scenario illustrating this division of opinion is a cyber incident 
directed against the New York Stock Exchange that causes the market to crash.”125  
Similarly, it did not provide a clear or firm opinion on the question of espionage, 
which thanks to the cyber weapons, reached an unprecedentedly different level in terms 
of danger threatening the affected country: “For instance, consider the example of cyber 
espionage by State A against State B that unexpectedly results in significant damage to 
State B’s cyber infrastructure. Some Experts were not willing to characterize the 
operation as an armed attack, although they acknowledged that measures could be taken 
to counteract the negative effects of the operation (especially in accordance with 
principle of necessity discussed in Commentary to Rule 9).”126 
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However, despite the numerous unclarified but crucial questions that remained open 
or only vaguely answered, the expert’s panel unfortunately did not make a call for a new 
convention on cyber warfare, which might clear up the most fundamental questions with 
corresponding legitimacy for the future. 
As the experts probably realize the main shortcomings of the Tallinn Manual, namely 
the fact that it responded to only very theoretical questions on cyber warfare but did not 
actually take into account the technical features that differentiate the cyber weapons and 
attacks from the kinetic ones, mainly.  There is also a lack of legitimacy caused by leaving 
most of the countries out of the drafting process, NATO’s CCDCOE convened another, 
this time even larger group of independent experts to prepare the Tallinn Manual 2.0.127 
The new Tallinn Manual is expected to be published by the end of 2016, and should 
be larger in every possible sense.  
First, led again by Professor Michael Schmitt from US Naval War College as its 
previous version, the team of authors of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 counted almost 50 
international law and cyber experts.  
Second, the version 2.0 will be consulted by 50 countries, so the process will be much 
more multilateral than before. 
Third, it should focus more on the actual types of cyber-attacks that countries have 
been facing recently and provide their legal review even if the attacks’ intensity and 
effects do not reach the necessary level so that they could be treated within the framework. 
As a result, the Tallinn Manual 2.0 should encompass particularly the position of cyber 
warfare in the context of human rights law, law of the sea, space law, international 
telecommunication law and diplomatic and consular law.  
  
                                                 




4. THE KEY INCOMPATIBILITIES OF CURRENT IHL RULES WITH 
CYBER WARFARE: ANONYMITY, TERRITORY & TIME 
The unsurpassable difference which is making cyber warfare incompatible with the 
current IHL is based upon three main factual differences between cyber warfare and 
kinetic warfare regardless the type of space the kinetic attacks take place in (land, air, 
sea). The three crucial differences are the following: authorship, location, and speed. 
Therefore, these differences will be developed into a detailed perspective in order to 
demonstrate that some of the key legal provisions and principles created for kinetic 
warfare cannot be applied on cyber-attacks. 
4.1 Anonymity of Authors of Cyber Attacks 
In cyber warfare, anonymity becomes a different notion than during kinetic attacks. 
The issue of anonymity of cyber-attacks is in fact closely linked to the impossibility to 
trace down the original source of such an attack, since it is usually located in an absolutely 
different location than the one of its targets.  
In addition, the route of a cyber-attack can take multiple detours only in order to cover 
its original source. The anonymity aspect is actually also one of the reasons why the 
attacks effectuated by modern war tools like drones are not considered as cyber-attacks – 
since even though a drone was operated from a very different place to the place of the 
attack, even from the other side of the world, its movements and its origin can be recorded 
and thus the drone can be easily traced down.  
On the other hand, the real cyber-attacks can be launched from a distant place that 
may remain fully unknown for a very long period of time, using an unknown path in order 
to hit the target - a perfect example was the Stuxnet family of malware, whose origin 
countries have been revealed by never confirmed and recognized by its author – 
aggressor. 
Therefore, in the kinetic warfare, keeping the anonymity of the aggressor was firstly 
impossible in the long term, secondly, even not desirable from the part of the aggressor. 
However, with the possibility to keep the identity of the author of cyber-attacks hidden 
even in a long run, sometimes even forever, possible cyber aggressors will probably prefer 
not to be revealed in order to minimize the probability of being attacked back. With cyber 




need to claim their successful attacks but tend to be satisfied as long as the targeted device 
or a program has been destroyed.  
Besides, once the location of the cyber aggressor is been revealed, it does not ensure 
revealing the identity of the author, since even though the attacker is a state entity, it can 
be made to look like the cyber-attacks were initiated purely by private entities or other 
states operating via their agents settled on the territory of the accused state. For instance, 
the series of Denial-of-Service attacks on Estonia in 2007 constitutes an exemplary 
situation when a state entity, the Russian Federation, denied its responsibility for the 
attacks and blamed it on a group of independent individuals.128   
4.1.1 The Difference between Civilians and Combatants  
One of the key areas where it would be impossible to apply the current IHL rules on 
cyber warfare in practice is the category of participants in an armed conflict, in particular 
combatants and civilians.  
According to the Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol, combatants have a right to 
participate in hostilities, unlike civilians that are defined negatively by Article 50 of 
Additional Protocol as those who do not enter any of the categories enumerated in the 
Article 4 (a) of the Convention.  
There are thus two categories of combatants: individuals that are “members of the 
armed forces of a belligerent party (with the exception of medical and religious 
personnel), even if their specific tasks are not related to active hostilities; and second, 
any other person who takes an active part in the hostilities; this second group are 
unlawful combatants.” 129 Hence, the civilians that become involved in hostilities but are 
not officially a part of belligerent party are qualified as unlawful combatants.  
However, the characteristics of cyber warfare add numerous challenges to this clear 
distinction. What about civilians whose IT facilities serve for transmission of cyber-
attacks? How can it be proved that they were not aware of the actions their computers and 
what networks were running? What about those that contribute to a cyber-attack by lawful 
actions but with harmful purposes like during a massive DoS attack where civilians can 
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contribute even through a lawful consultation of a certain webpage or execution of other 
lawful actions but in an organized and coordinated manner?  
The Tallinn Manual states that: “Civilians are not prohibited from directly participating 
in cyber operations amounting to hostilities but forfeit their protection from attacks for such 
time as they so participate.”130 However, this stance does not resolve the practical aspect of 
the issue when civilians get involved in transmission of a CNA, which can literally last a 
millisecond but can have vast impacts on targeted objects. 
Additionally, the lawful combatants are supposed to fulfil four cumulative conditions 
prescribed by the Article 13 (2) of Geneva Conventions: “(a) that of being commanded 
by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their 
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”131 The requirements (b) and 
(c) seem for cyber attackers quite irrelevant, though.  
However, for instance the Tallinn Manual, which argues that the IHL rules are 
applicable on cyber warfare, only cite those requirements without providing any 
explicative details about how to apply them on cyber combatants in practice.132 There is 
indeed no means to fit the IHL rules onto the cyber “soldiers” by interpretation, which is 
one of the reasons why a new Convention on cyber warfare is needed. 
Moreover, regarding the status of civilians and their rights, civilians generally 
protected under Article 13 of Additional Protocol, whose paragraph 2 also prohibits “acts 
or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian 
population”133.  
The current IHL provisions prescribe certain types of weapons as special precautions 
that are required to be taken when conducting an attack in order to spare the civilian 
population from hostilities.134 They include selecting weapons and tactics “with a view to 
avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians 
and damage to civilian objects,”135 which could in many cases exclude the use of cyber 
weapons as their magnitude is always highly disputable.  
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As mentioned before, forcing an electric grid or a power plant out of order, or even 
only disabling access and functioning of government websites and online systems 
(including software operated by consulates and embassies where there is an actual risk of 
death in the case that they are inaccessible for multiple days or weeks), would constitute 
an act of violence among the civilian population. It would be difficult to argue that it was 
not with the primary purpose to spread terror amongst civilians. 
4.2 Territorial Aspects of Cyber Armed Conflicts 
Territorial aspect is equally one of the most differentiating features of cyber warfare. 
Even when operated from different place not identical to their own locations, kinetic 
weapons can always act only at one particular place at a time.  
However, CNA do not contain a category titled ‘virus’ by coincidence: they can be 
precisely targeted but they can and more often do act rather like chemical or biological 
weapons – spreading uncontrollably at many places at once.  
One of the main issues connected to cyber-attacks is  the way they reach their targets, 
since it is mostly done through civilians’ IT networks including those located in other 
countries, which can be also a targeted country.  
In fact, cyber weapons can legally pass through another entity’s networks or data 
clouds, since the current law of armed conflict does not contain any provision that would 
imply a general prohibition on passing the data. Thus passively legalizing a cyber-attack 
in the areas, where such an attack would be prohibited, if it was a location of a 
conventional armed conflict.  
The Tallinn Manual also recognizes the difficulties connected with the territoriality 
issue and perceives it through cyber lenses: “Restrictions based on geographical 
limitations may be particularly difficult to implement in the context of cyber warfare. For 
instance, consider a cyber-attack using cloud-computing techniques. Data used to 
prosecute the attack from one State may be replicated across servers in a number of other 
States, including neutral States, but only observably reflected on the systems where the 
attack is initiated and completed. As discussed in Rules 8 and 92, there is no general 
prohibition on the mere transit of data through areas where the conduct of cyber 
operations is otherwise prohibited during an armed conflict.”136  
                                                 




Therefore, regarding the responsibility of a state for its networks, i.e. for “passing the 
data” that cause a cyber-attack, the Manual suggests to take off the responsibility from 
the transmitting countries as indicated in the above-mentioned Rule 7 and 8 of the 
Manual. 
Nevertheless, taken into account possible impact of this decision, the stance of the 
International Group of Experts on the responsibility of transmitting countries should be 
equally confirmed (or declined) by the international community. 
4.2.1 Law of Neutrality and the Globalized Cyber World 
Nonetheless, the Tallinn Manual Group of Experts underlined that today’s world of 
global cyber infrastructure does not correspond to the times when the IHL rules were 
created and as such were considering only “situations in which entrance into or exit from 
a neutral State’s territory is a physical act.”137  
However, the experts basically applied the present law of neutrality, originating from 
Hague Conventions V and XIII and customary international law and currently applies 
currently only in IAC, onto cyber operations. As stated in the Chapter VII of the Manual: 
‘‘neutral cyber infrastructure’ means public or private cyber infrastructure that is 
located within neutral territory”138 and as such enjoys the protection of neutral territory: 
“the exercise of belligerent rights by cyber means directed against neutral cyber 
infrastructure is prohibited.”139  
Nevertheless, regarding the nature and the reality of cyber-attacks when a lack of 
transmission of data could sometimes constitute the only way to prevent the cyber-attack 
from happening and resulting in massive damages both to people’s lives and physical 
objects including infrastructure and public goods, a decision whether to apply the concept 
of neutrality on cyber warfare in an unchanged form or whether to modify them 
accordingly needs to be made unconditionally by the Member States of the international 
community. 
Since in the context of cyber warfare, where the state aggressor is not interested in 
recognizing its authorship and when the battlefield is practically all created by cyber space 
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but practically includes also physical IT servers and networks, it could be highly 
dangerous to apply un unrevised concept of neutrality also on cyber warfare.  
The discrepancies between the application of the current principle of neutrality on 
kinetic and cyber warfare raised doubts also amongst the Group of Experts: “The 
International Group of Experts struggled with the situation in which a cyber-attack 
against a military objective in belligerent territory has spill over effects in neutral 
territory. For example, a cyber-attack on a server in belligerent territory could 
significantly affect services in neutral territory. The Experts agreed that if such effects 
are not foreseeable, the attack does not violate the law of neutrality.”140  Again, the 
terminology used by the Tallinn Manual is quite fragile, as one of the main natural 
features of cyber-attacks is the non-foreseeability of their impacts. 
4.2.2 Territoriality of Armed Conflict in the Cyber World and NIAC 
So far, the Laws of War presume that an armed conflict is always taking place in a 
specific area, which can be traced on a map. In general, the territory of the armed conflict 
was defined in the contexts of provisions of spies, who in case of capture do not benefit 
from the status of war prisoner.  
But under certain conditions and when in the territory controlled by their party, a 
member of armed forces of the respective party should not be considered as spies, which 
is plausibly the main reason the zone of an armed conflict as well as the place from where 
the members of armed forces operate, became a highly important issue for IHL. The 
Article 29 of the Hague Regulations uses the notion of “zone of operations of a 
belligerent”141.  
Moreover, the Article 46 (2) of the Additional Protocol I enlarges such a zone to 
“territory controlled by an adverse Party.”142  However, such a distinction becomes 
impossible to implement in practice in case of an armed conflict, which would also 
comprise cyber-attacks. 
In fact, if an armed conflict with a cyber-attack component is similar in terms of 
territoriality to any current type of armed conflicts, it would be probably the NIAC, since 
it is especially the members of non-state organized armed groups such as terrorist groups, 
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which tend to attack without respect to the territorial limits of conflict areas, and have 
been more and more proliferating: “The development within the international community 
has, however, caused the increasing  importance of other subjects and entities  of 
international law  and not only in the IHL context – movements of national liberation, 
insurgents, or even terrorists. Such evolution constitutes a real challenge for the legal 
framework of  the IHL tailored to states as original and only actors of the international 
community.”143 
However, IHL currently does not sufficiently cover the territoriality issue in the 
context of NIAC: “According to the traditional view of the law of armed conflict, military 
operations during a non-international armed conflict must be limited to the territory 
(including the territorial sea) and national airspace of the State in which the conflict is 
taking place. However, [...] today the exact geographical scope of non-international 
armed conflict raises a number of complex issues. Many States and commentators now 
take the view that a non- international armed conflict may extend to areas beyond the 
borders of the State in question, arguing that it is the status of the actors, not geography, 
which is the determinative factor in classification of conflict.”144  
The current blurred line for the determination of a NIAC could theoretically serve as 
a basis when searching for how to (re)define the rule of limiting the battlefield to the 
territory of armed conflict in case cyber weapons are used, too.  
In theory, in the rule 23 of the Tallinn Manual, the International Group of Experts sets 
up the possibility of that a NIAC can be triggered solely by cyber-attacks thanks to the 
article 2 and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and on the case law.145  
Nonetheless, conflicts of any nature can be qualified as NIAC if they reach a certain 
threshold of gravity, which was generally defined in the Tadic Decision of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yougoslavia by “the gravity of attacks and 
their recurrence146; the temporal and territorial expansion of violence and the collective 
character of hostilities147; whether various parties were able to operate from a territory 
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under their control 148 ; an increase in the number of government forces 149 ; the  
mobilization of volunteers and the distribution and type of weapons among both parties 
to the conflict150; the fact that the conflict led to a large displacement of people151; and 
whether the conflict is the subject of any relevant scrutiny or action by the Security 
Council.152”153 
Therefore, the Tallinn Manual argues that a possibility of a cyber-attack triggering a 
conflict that would reach the necessary threshold of gravity that would enable its 
qualification as a non-international armed conflict, would be in reality practically almost 
impossible: “cyber operations alone can trigger a non-international armed conflict in 
only rare cases.”154  
However, as for today, taking into account many terrorist organizations such as ISIS, 
such cases might not be that rare anymore.  
Although, if the interpretation of today’s IHL rules are being disputed in case of 
NIAC, which is a type of conflict that might theoretically arise even when the IHL rules 
were created, then it might be practically impossible to interpret the territorial aspects of 
the IHL rules in the context of cyber-attacks, which were not foreseeable even back then 
when the rules were created. Therefore, it seems inevitable to precisely define the relation 
of the IHL rules on territoriality onto armed conflicts consisting of cyber-attacks 
preferably in a new convention. 
4.3 Time Issue and Speed of Cyber-Attacks 
The third main aspect in which the cyber-attacks differ dramatically from the so far 
known kinetic attacks is time. The issue of cyber-attack speed causes problems both in 
jus ad bellum and IHL regime. In jus ad bellum, the issue particular arises in regarding 
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the right to self-defense defined in the Article 51 of the UN Charter, which underlines the 
immediate character of response to an armed attack.  
Nevertheless, the immediacy of self-defense can be relative in terms of cyber warfare. 
On the one hand, there are cyber-attacks with detectable causes immediately after their 
launch as in the case of DoS attacks in Estonia or during the war between Georgia and 
Russia in 2008. However, there are also cyber-attacks that can have much more severe 
character and yet, their impacts are not detected but several months or even years later 
after their launch.  
Another issue in the jus ad bellum regime connected to time is the notion of preventive 
and preemptive attacks. For instance, the International Group of Experts rejected the idea 
of a “preventive self-defense” to a cyber-attack.  
Moreover, they did not answer the pre-emptive self-defense in a persuasive manner 
either: “the critical question is not the temporal proximity of the anticipatory defensive 
action to the perspective armed attack, but whether a failure to act at that moment would 
reasonably be expected to result in that State being unable to defend itself effectively 
when that attack actually starts.”155  
Concerning the IHL regime, there are equally numerous reasons why its current rules 
cannot apply by interpretation to a cyber-attack due to the time issue. 
 Firstly, cyber-attacks can spread much faster and with much higher exponential 
dimension than kinetic attacks. Even in comparison with bombs, in terms of distance per 
unit of time, cyber-attacks would still be faster, in addition to their global scope. 
Secondly, only some types of the most dangerous cyber-attacks are usually detected 
at the time they hit their target. 
Despite the fact that in cases of cyber-attacks of a large scale, the immediately 
recognizable cyber-attacks would become more frequent. The espionage types of attacks 
that are used for preparing the battlefield as did for instance Duqu and Flame for Stuxnet 
are very difficult to discover at the time they are hitting the target, since the most 
complicated cyber-attacks are designed to act unnoticed and overcome anti-malware 
software. 
In addition, the presence of some of them is often revealed rather by chance due to 
their (side) effects like slowing down the targeted operation system or causing blackouts 
                                                 




thanks to their commands, which they are programed to perform. Therefore, nowadays, 
the majority of cyber-attacks are not revealed until several weeks or months after the first 
infection of the IT facility.  
Moreover, as the results of the fact that cyber-attacks are not always visible to the 
public, some of the affected entities prefer not to inform about themselves becoming a 
target of a cyber-attack, or at least not immediately.  Therefore, the IHL rules where the 
notion of urgency is sometimes decisive should be reviewed.  
Additionally, another important principle of IHL, which could be modified in order 
to reflect the time inconsistency of cyber-attacks is the principle of proportionality, which 
is codified in the Article 51 (5) (b) and repeated in the Article 57 of the Additional 
Protocol and which prohibits any excessive i.e. disproportionally large armed attacks.  
It is also closely linked to the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks that are defined in 
the Article 51 (4) of the Additional Protocol as those: “(a) which are not directed at a 
specific military objective; (b) which employ a method or means of combat which cannot 
be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) which employ a method or means of 
combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by International Humanitarian 
Law; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives 
and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”156  
The indiscriminate attacks are nonetheless different from the direct hostilities against 
civilians, since “the attacker is not actually trying to harm the civilian population.”157 
However, as cyber law expert Dinniss points  out: “Viruses  and  worms are  two methods 
of computer network attack, which are particularly likely to fall into this category as their  
effects are  often not limited by their  creators.”158  
Since viruses and worms often contain self-reproducing and self-spreading 
commands, they can easily slip out of the targeted networks of computers or other IT 
facilities and spread freely and unstoppably around the world including civilian networks 
and computers. In fact, Trojans that usually need either an action for the part of the user, 
an unwanted click that launches their installation from an email or contaminated website, 
or an insertion of an affected USB stick, may be considered as indiscriminate attacks. 
Once again, the international community should make such an evaluation. 
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5. NECESSARY COMPONENTS OF A NEW IHL CONVENTION ON CYBER 
WARFARE 
Unlike the previous chapters, which aimed to provide critical review of current Laws 
of War in the context of cyber conflicts, or rather their incompatibility with cyber warfare, 
i.e. examine the measures de lege lata, the last chapter will completely adopt the de lege 
ferenda approach. The last chapter of the thesis therefore aims to suggest a very rough 
draft version of the key aspects that should comprise a new convention on cyber warfare 
including its parties and authors and mains aspects of warfare, which are different from 
traditional warship due to the cyber nature of an armed conflict. 
5.1 Formal Attributes of the Convention 
First of all, the term “Convention” should be understood as in the sense of an 
international treaty, i.e. “an international agreement concluded between states in written 
form and governed by international law,”159 as defined by the Vienna Convention on the 
law of treaties from 23 May 1969. 
Secondly, concerning the contracting Parties, as usual for all international treaties, the 
contracting Parties shall be defined by the Vienna Formula160, which contains a larger 
number of possible parties to a Convention and at the same time, is more precise than the 
All-State Formula.  
The whole contracting process should be conducted within the framework of the 
United Nations and in line with the parts of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties that are recognized as a part of customary law.  
The scope of application concerning the addressed entities would be plausibly one of 
the most challenging issues. Nonetheless, regarding the current situation in the world, 
where the non-state actors are in the core of the largest and most severe armed conflicts, 
in order to ensure an effective and efficient implementation in practice, it would be 
quintessential to include also the non-state actors. However, the scope of included armed 
conflicts would most probably stay limited to International Armed Conflicts.  
 One of the most important aspects would be also the relation of the cyber treaty 
towards the law of Hague and Geneva Conventions. In order to eliminate any possible 
legal vacuum, it might be necessary to clearly stipulate that the relation between the two 
                                                 
159 Article 2 (1) (a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 




would work as lex specialis towards legi generali, so that the validity of the current IHL 
customary law and the general principles in the field of cyber warfare would be officially 
recognized and all doubts regarding the relation between the two avoided.  
Finally, concerning the possibility of reservations to the Cyber Convention, the final 
say should be left to the negotiation process, since reservations to a treaty are in general 
an unpopular but often necessary means how to make sure the treaty can benefit from a 
general acceptability and legitimacy. At the same time, the reservations should not 
overcome a bearable threshold, which divides respected treaties in practice to the extent 
that they later become a part of the customary law even with their reservations and those 
whose legitimacy is in practice threatened or prevented by too many substantive 
reservations. 
5.2 Key Provisions  
Nonetheless, the key aspects of the new Convention on Cyber Warfare should consist 
in rewriting the parts of IHL that would cause the most inconsistencies if applied on cyber 
warfare due to the specific nature of incomparable certain areas with the conventional 
warfare, weaponry and strategies. 
5.2.1 Redefining the Notion of Attack in the Cyber Context 
First, it should be clearly stated that a cyber-attack could be under certain conditions 
considered as an attack in the sense of the Article 49 (1) Additional Protocol I, where the 
notion of “violence” presenting the sine qua non element of the attack definition must be 
specified in cyber terms.  
Therefore, the new cyber treaty needs to contain a new definition of an attack in cyber 
terms, so called cyber-attack, which would be the lex specialis for the current IHL 
definition of attack.  
Cyber-attacks could thus be defined as the cyber operations, whether offensive or 
defensive, which, if exercised, have a serious direct impact onto persons or objects 
resulting in human injuries and deaths or in a serious damage or destruction of objects 
indispensable for a survival of a civilian population including public infrastructure and 
its networks. The wording “if exercised” would help include also those cyber-attacks, 
which would have caused the cited damages, but were stopped by the targeted country 




The Tallinn Manual for instance suggests defining the cyber-attacks as a “cyber 
operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or 
death to persons or damage or destructions to objects.”161  
Although the formulation develops the notion of a cyber-attack, the wording 
“reasonably expected” does not provide a clear definition of when a cyber-attack can be 
considered as an attack in IHL. 
Similar formulation is used also in the rule 81 of the Tallinn Manual on Protection of 
Objects Indispensable to Survival, which presumes that “Attacking, destroying, removing, 
or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population by 
means of cyber operations is prohibited,”162 which is derived directly from the Article 54 
(2) of the Additional Protocol I.  
However, as the IHL interprets this rule concretely in relation to the starvation of the 
civilian population and its prohibition as a method of warfare in the Article 53 of the 
Additional Protocol I. It is questionable what exactly the survival of the civilian 
population stands for especially in the context of private goods and infrastructure 
indispensable for many of today’s modern societies.  
To the condition of survival, the International Group of Experts also added the 
situation when a population is forced to move, which if restated by the international 
community, could significantly enlarge the range of prohibited cyber operations: “cyber 
operations may not be conducted against objects if those operations can be expected to 
so deprive the civilian population of food or water that it starves or is forced to move.”163 
In addition, the notion of objects indispensable to the survival created one hundred 
years ago could actually be qualified as having a different meaning today. For instance, 
the Internet connection could be in twenty years considered as indispensable for survival 
in urban areas all over the world. 
5.2.2 Principle of Distinction 
The principle of distinction between the civilian population and combatants and 
between the objects and military objectives originates in the Articles 48 and 52 (2) of 
Additional Protocol I. In its Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case, the 
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International Court of Justice called the principle of distinction a “cardinal principle”164 
of IHL as well as one of the “intransgressible principles of international customary 
law”.165 The principle is also possible to be found in the Statue of the International 
Criminal Court, which stipulates that: “intentionally directing attacks against civilian 
objects that is, objects which are not military objectives”166 represents a war crime in 
international armed conflicts.  
There have been also several practical cases that provided a recognition of the 
principle such as the Tadic case, where the principle was actually broadened and applied 
onto NIACs,167 and the conflict in the Middle East in October 1973, when the ICRC 
appealed to the state parties of the conflict to respect the distinction between civilian and 
military objectives, which was positively complied by the concerned countries i.e. the 
Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq, Egypt, and Israel.168 
From the conceptual point of view, some legal scholars as well as military legal 
experts argue that it is not possible to respect the principle anymore. For instance, Charles 
Dunlap, former Deputy Judge Advocate General of the US Air Force, argues in favour of 
effect-based operations even for the price of targeting civilians’ objects.  
Since the effect-based theory of warfare is based on the combination of political and 
economic pressure and threats of severe attacks in exchange of a quick end to an armed 
conflict: “We need a new paradigm when using force against societies with malevolent 
propensities. We must hold at risk the very way of life that sustains their depredations, 
and we must threaten to destroy their world as they know it if they persist. This means the 
air weapon should be unleashed against entire new categories of property that current 
conceptions of [Laws of Armed Conflict] put off-limits.”169  
On the other side of the law of warfare theories, there are advocates of insurgents and 
anti-states dictatorship of rules such as Gabriel Swiney who argues that the principle of 
distinction can be easily adopted by the oppressing state regimes with all their institutional 
and military machineries, however, it also constitutes a significant obstacle for insurgents 
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fighting against the regime or for their group’s recognition especially but not only in 
NIAC.170  
Nevertheless, the distinction in cyberwarfare is an extremely complex issue, since the 
cyber weaponry can either significantly simplify the situation thanks to precise targeting, 
which is characteristic for certain types of CNAs such was the case for Stuxnet, but also 
makes the situation extremely difficult due to side-effects of some CNA – for instance 
the DOS attacks but also Stuxnet-type of CNA, if not well targeted or when spreading 
gets out of control.  
Yet, it seems crucial to preserve the principle of distinction in the context of cyber 
warfare too, since it is one of the few forms of protection the civilian population. Despite 
the fact that Swiney’s argument seems to be reasonable and extremely pertinent especially 
in the first decade and half of the 21st century, which has been characterised by many 
NIAC and insurgent movements, it is extremely improbable that the states would 
recognise the most favourite current form of the insurgents’ practices as lawful under 
IHL, as the attacks targeting civilian populations are also one of the characteristics of 
terrorist movements.   
5.2.3 Lawfully Targeted Individuals 
According to IHL, there are three categories of individuals who can be lawfully 
subjected to targeting during an armed conflict: “Combatants, civilians directly 
participating in hostilities, and civilians acting in a continuous combat function. Civilians 
lose their right not to be targeted to the extent that they ‘take a direct part in hostilities. 
Furthermore, under customary international law affirmed by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, civilians who adopt a continuous combat function may also 
be targeted.171”172  
However, as evoked earlier, it can be practically impossible to distinguish a combatant 
or another lawfully targeted individual from a civilian for two main reasons.  
First, it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether a civilian is 
aware of their computer network device participating in a cyber-attack. 
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Secondly, the civilian engineers and other designers of weaponry were not considered 
as lawfully targeted individuals because their role was indeed minor in comparison to 
military leaders including military engineers and generals.  
Nonetheless, the role of civilian software engineers is apparently significantly more 
important in the context of cyberwarfare, especially because once the CNA is launched, 
often no more actions are needed, since its route and actions have been automatically 
programmed by its creators. This feature of cyberwarfare can be easily abused by official 
state authorities, which can deny any connection to a civilian group that openly claims 
responsibility for an attack as it probably happened during the cyber-attacks against 
Estonia in 2007, when the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi claimed responsibility for the 
attacks.173 
Therefore, it is possible that the new cyber treaty would contain provisions, which 
would consider all civilians actively and knowingly participating on cyber-attacks 
including their preparation and organization as lawfully targeted individuals.  
On the other hand, individuals, whose computer network devices are contributing to 
cyber-attacks without their owner’s knowledge, cannot become subjects to lawful 
targeting. Similarly, it does not seem possible that the state, through whose computer 
networks a cyber-attack is conducted, could be held (partly) accountable for attacks; 
unless it is proven that it was done so with its leaders being aware of it.  
5.2.4 Lawfully Targeted Objects 
A cyber-attack on private entities could be in theory considered as an armed-attack 
only if it had serious health-threatening impacts on a country’s citizens. It is rather 
unrealistic to expect that the international community would agree that an attack on a 
stock exchange software is considered as an armed attack despite the wide range of 
possible serious damages that it could cause including major loss of jobs and consequent 
threats to survival of many civilians. 
However, even the International Group of Experts was divided over this issue: “Some 
of the Experts were unprepared to label it [attack against the New York Stock Exchange] 
as an armed attack because they were not satisfied that mere financial loss constitutes 
damage for this purpose. Others emphasized the catastrophic effects such a crash would 
occasion and therefore regards them as sufficient to characterize the cyber operation as 
                                                 




an armed attack” 174 . Thus, a clear statement with the legitimacy of international 
community is needed. 
5.2.5 Principle of Neutrality 
The principle of neutrality is closely related to the assumption that it is possible to 
delimitate the geographical area the armed conflict is taking place in. Consequently, it 
was set up to protect especially civilians and their property as well as other state entities 
and their population situated in proximity but not directly in the zone of the armed 
conflict.  
However, this presumption does not very well correspond to the reality of cyber 
warfare, in which the delimitation of the zone of an armed conflict is not possible. 
Regardless of this impossibility, the Tallinn Manual still overtakes the current principle 
of neutrality and applies it to cyber-attacks. In its Rule 91 and 92 on Protection of Neutral 
Cyber Infrastructure respectively Cyber Operations in Neutral Territory, it says that the 
neutrality principle prohibits the belligerents in use of cyber weaponry against neutral 
cyber infrastructure and in neutral territory.175  
The Group of Experts took such a stance being perfectly aware of the geographical 
issue with cyber weapons: “the fact that the law of neutrality developed based on 
situations in which entrance into or exit from a neutral State’s territory is a physical 
act,”176 which is not very consistent with the Rules 91 and 92, though, and might create 
many issues in practice, if ever stipulated in the Cyber Convention in the same way.  
Therefore, Convention should instead reformulate the principle of neutrality based 
on the specific nature of cyber weapons and provide concrete provisions on which 
territory and cyber infrastructure are considered as neutral. Would it be all those officially 
labelled as civilian or indispensable for civilians even if they are being simultaneously 
used for military purposes?  
Even though it may seem only logical to ban all belligerent cyber operations towards 
neutral infrastructure and in neutral territory, as it would evoke the right to self-defense, 
it should be confirmed by the international community. 
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Nonetheless, regarding such a prohibition, the real concern consists in the extent of 
states whose IT infrastructure or territory are used for transmitting cyber-attacks should 
be held accountable.  
The Rule 93 of the Tallinn Manual suggests that “a neutral State may not knowingly 
allow the exercise of belligerent rights by the parties to the conflict from cyber 
infrastructure located in its territory or under its exclusive control.”177 However, proving 
to the government authorities that they permitted a cyber-attack launched from their 
territory knowingly will be an extremely difficult if not even impossible task. 
5.2.6 Principle of Proportionality  
The principle of proportionality in IHL is based in the Article 51 (5) (b), which 
requires to anticipate incidental loss of civilian lives, injuries and damages to civilian 
objects and make sure that those will not exceed the concrete and direct military 
advantage brought by the attack. In the opposite case, the attack is by the IHL rules 
prohibited as indiscriminate. 
Obviously, it is already rather difficult to follow whether the principle of 
proportionality is respected in the current armed conflicts, since the concrete and direct 
military advantage would not be probably evaluated the same by the offensive party and 
by an impartial judge, let alone the defensive party. Therefore, it is not the bordering cases 
where the author’s party could be prosecuted for breach of the proportionality principle 
but rather the obvious cases where the defense actions as a reaction to an attack would be 
extremely disproportionate. 
However, such an evaluation requires a thorough analysis of anticipated incidental 
casualties and/or damages to civilian objects, which in cyber warfare, are usually not easy 
to determine, since the targeted objects may be a part of a vast civilian systems or may 
share civilian networks. 
5.2.7 Permitted Defense  
The last major reason why it is in the very own interest of states as members of the 
international community to have a new international treaty is not only to give legal 
permission to use kinetic weapons in self-defense against cyber-attacks, but also to give 
legal permission to use cyber weapons as a means of defense against cyber and kinetic 
                                                 




armed attacks. As countries around the world do not have the same level of dependency 
on cyber infrastructure and services, they do not have the same level of vulnerability 
against cyber-attacks either.  
Moreover, despite the high price, the costs of cyber-attacks can be still much lower 
than the costs of kinetic attacks. Besides, the present status is not sure whether cyber-
attacks can be officially considered as armed attacks according to international public 
law. This may act as an encouraging factor for using cyber weapons especially for 
countries on the edge of the international community.  
For instance, North Korea seems to be developing a strong cyber war program178 as 
a less-costly but very efficient alternative to kinetic weapons in case of a new conflict 
with South Korea, a country extremely dependent on its IT infrastructure, with the highest 
internet connection speed in the world.179  
There have been already several cyber-attacks detected between the two countries 
featuring numerous attacks by the Lazarus Group against banks, media stations and 
manufacturing entities including some cases of military espionage as well as the attack 
against the Sony Pictures Entertainment on 24 November 2014, which followed Sony’s 
controversial satirical movie on North-Korean political authorities.180  
In addition, one of the latest cases recorded by the South Korean officials was a case 
of hacking mobile devices of 40 South Korean national security officers publicized on 13 
March 2016.181  
North Korean attacks were not oriented only towards South Korea. On 30 May 2016, 
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (Swift), an internet 
provider of secured financial messaging services, reported that numerous banks claimed 
to have suffered a certain type of cyber-attack, whose origins were traced to North 
Korea.182 
However, categorized according to targets, the most serious cyber-attack hailing 
apparently from North Korea happened on South Korean nuclear plants in December 
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2014.183 Even though no actual serious damages were recorded, the hackers tempted to 
affect the functioning of atomic reactors, which could cause serious damages, if the attack 
had succeeded.  
The issue of a possible legal use of cyber weapons as a means of not only self-defense 
but also as an action in the sense of the Article 41 and 42 of the UN Charter becomes 
even more pertinent in the context of the Resolution 2270 of the UN Security Council 
issued on 2 March 2016, which imposed new sanctions on North Korea as a response to 
their nuclear test conducted on 6 January 2016.184  
Once clearly formulated in the Cyber Convention, which would be created within the 
framework of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council could even decide on direct cyber 
operations against countries illegally running their own nuclear programs. 
Nonetheless, unlike nowadays, publicity of such measures would have to be 
restricted, which could also be regulated by the new Cyber Convention. This would allow 
to the UN Security Council not to publicize resolutions adopted in unanimity, which 
would imply taking cyber actions against countries’ nuclear-weapon programs that would 
constitute threats to the peace in conformity with the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
5.2.8 Cyber Espionage  
In the context of cyber weapons, which can have vast consequences even when 
utilized in a form of an espionage malware or a system of related malwares and can 
constitute an irreplaceable part of a multidimensional-armed attack, should be 
reconsidered. Currently, according to the Article 46 of Additional Protocol I and the 
Articles 29 and 31 of the Hague Regulations, espionage is not considered as a violation 
of international law. However, the practice of cyber espionage could violate some of the 
current IHL rules like the Article 37 of the Additional Protocol I. 
Additionally, it is again the deformed notion of armed conflict and its zone that is as 
divergent as it could only be in case of cyber warfare. Already, the definition of espionage 
in the Article 29 of the Hague Regulations counts on existence of a precisely demarcated 
zone of operations: “A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or 
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on false pretences, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the zone of 
operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. 
Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of 
the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies.”185 
However, in the cyber world, the whole world or at least whole countries and their IT 
infrastructure could become the zone of operations. Now, most cyber operations, which 
could not be classified as armed attacks, would not be perceived as espionage but as “the 
employment of measures necessary for obtaining information about the enemy are 
considered permissible”186 as says the Article 26 of the Hague Regulations.  
Similarly, the International Group of Experts, being aware of the current legal status 
of CNA as well as of the diverging character of cyber espionage in comparison to the 
conventional espionage techniques, followed the current doctrine and made a distinction 
between espionage taking place in the territory of the affected state: “Cyber espionage 
and other forms of information gathering directed at an adversary during an armed 
conflict do not violate the law of armed conflict”187; and outside of its territory: “Cyber 
espionage must be distinguished from computer network exploitation (CNE), which is a 
doctrinal, as distinct from an international law, concept.  CNE often occurs from beyond 
enemy territory, using remote access operations. Cyber operators sometimes also use the 
term ‘cyber reconnaissance’. The term refers to the use of cyberspace capabilities to 
obtain information about enemy activities, information resources, or system capabilities. 
CNE and cyber reconnaissance are not cyber espionage when conducted from outside 
enemy controlled territory.”188  
Nevertheless, the Group concluded that neither of the two violate the current Laws of 
War. Given the unparalleled character of cyber warfare and the lack of “zone of 
operations” in the cyber world, the definition and the per se legality of espionage should 
be confirmed or restated for the case of cyber warfare. 
All in all, members of international community need to be provided with a clear stance 
on the cyber espionage, which currently remains one of the greyest areas of Laws of War 
applied on cyber warfare.  
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In its five chapters, this thesis provided a set of arguments proving the necessity of 
drafting a new international Convention on cyber warfare and cyber weapons.  
Firstly, to assure that all key terms and understood in a unique sense, the thesis 
focused on the essential terminology of Laws of Wars, especially IHL and its theory 
including the necessary philosophical and historical background, which constituted a key 
element in its development.  
Secondly, the thesis provided as well a detailed description of cyber warfare and cyber 
weapons, since their main characteristics, actions and consequently effects constitute a 
new object which does not have to be familiar to legal experts, but which is necessary in 
order to understand the whole scope and the power of cyber warfare.  
Thirdly, a set of the most important reasons was introduced in order to prove that a 
mere interpretation of the current Laws of War and more specifically the IHL rules cannot 
serve as a sufficient and reliable source of binding rules applicable on cyber warfare.  
The fourth chapter developed the previous one by pointing out the main differences 
between the kinetic weapons, for which the current treaties were written, and the cyber 
ones, thus trying to highlight the major aspects of incompatibilities between the two. 
Finally, the last chapter tried to provide a draft of both the main formal, and 
substantive aspects, of the new Cyber Warfare Convention, and thus reinforcing the 
arguments of the major issues arising when it comes to the application of Laws of War 
and IHL in particular to cyber warfare. Arguing this cannot be resolved in any other way 
but by a consensus of international community embodied in a new international 
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TEZE DIPLOMOVÉ PRÁCE V ČESKÉM JAZYCE (SUMMARY IN CZECH 
LANGUAGE) 
1. Základní východiska válečného a mezinárodního humanitárního 
práva 
Během posledních dvaceti let, kybernetický prostor zahrnující počítačové sítě a jejich 
zařízení prostoupil významnou měrou všechny důležité sféry lidského života, a to včetně 
ozbrojených konfliktů. V jejich oblasti pak kybernetické sféra dosáhla rozměrů naprosto 
nevídaných a jen těžce představitelných v době vytvoření právního rámce určeného pro 
regulaci použití této sféry a jejích nástrojů ve válečném stavu na mezinárodní úrovni, a 
sice válečného a mezinárodního humanitárního práva (MHP).  
Přesto tato pravidla určená pro regulaci ozbrojených kinetických konfliktů 
v současnosti regulují i mezinárodní konflikty kybernetické, a nadto pouze teoreticky, 
neboť v praxi v této oblasti panuje mezinárodně právní vakuum. Jelikož, i když je 
stávající teze taková, že se na mezinárodní kybernetické konflikty dosahující úrovně 
ozbrojených konfliktů kinetických aplikuje MPV v plném rozsahu, tato teze je nejenže 
v praxi kvůli naprosto odlišnému charakteru kybernetických zbraní a útoků zřídka kdy 
proveditelná, nicméně navíc ani není potvrzená žádným oficiálním konsensem na 
mezinárodní úrovni. 
Proto si tato práce klade za cíl v prvé řadě osvětlit problematiku kybernetických 
útoků, jejich charakter a klasifikaci; představit ty oblasti a nástroje kybernetické války, 
jež jsou prakticky nepokryté současnou MHP úpravou; poukázat na hlavní oblasti 
inkompatibility kybernetických konfliktů se stávajícím MHP rámcem určeným pro 
kinetické konflikty spočívající především v odlišnostech co do autorství, času a teritoria; 
a konečně představit návrh řešení současného stavu, a sice návrh nové mezinárodní 
úmluvy o kybernetické válce a klíčové prvky, které by měla obsahovat. 
Válečné právo („laws of war“) má svůj původ v teorii spravedlivé války, která se 
objevuje již u Cicera v jeho De Officiis roku 44 př.n.l. V té době teorie spravedlivé války 
obsahovala pravidla nejen pro vedení války, ale také pro její začátek, a tak v sobě 
spojovala dva původní režimy válečného práva, a sice jus ad bellum, tj. právní úpravu 
vztahující se na období před vstupem do ozbrojeného konfliktu vymezující legitimní 
vstup země do války, a jus in bello, které je dnes známo jako mezinárodní humanitární 
právo, tj. pravidla pro vedení ozbrojeného konfliktu jako takového, bez ohledu na to, zda 




spravedlivé války přidán i třetí, a sice jus post bellum, jež se vztahuje na časové období 
po ukončení válečného konfliktu, a v současnosti se dá prakticky ztotožnit 
s mezinárodním právem trestním.  
Práce se soustředí na režim MHP, nicméně v některých částech pojednává také o jus 
ad bellum a méně často pak i jus post bellum, neboť zaprvé bylo mnohdy nutné vymezit 
rozdíl v pojetí literárně totožných pojmů v těchto režimech, poněvadž se význam 
dotyčných pojmů v závislosti na tom či onom režimu markantně liší; zadruhé se v mnoha 
odborných pramenech zabývajících se otázkou vztahu MHP a kybernetické války tato 
prolíná s otázkou vztahu kybernetické války a jus ad bella, takže při analýze těchto 
pramenů bylo zmínění příbuzných právních rámců vztahujících se na ostatní dva válečné 
režimy nevyhnutelné. 
V současnosti se teorie spravedlivé války i nadále vyvíjí, a ovlivňuje tak i 
mezinárodněprávně politický vývoj. Nejnovější koncept, podle kterého suverenita státu 
zahrnuje také jeho odpovědnost za ochranu vlastních obyvatel a jejich lidských práv, se 
nazývá Odpovědnost za ochranu („Responsibility to Protect“, R2P). Koncept ustanovený 
ve Výstupní dokumentu Světového summitu Spojených národů v roce 2005 stanoví, že 
v případě selhání suverénního státu v povinnosti dostát své odpovědnosti za ochranu 
svého obyvatelstva, je zajištěním této ochrany povinováno mezinárodní společenství na 
základě rozhodnutích Rady bezpečnosti. 
Navzdory mnoha pokusům předních právních expertů, filozofů a vojevůdců 
definovat termín války, žádný se neujal tak, jako Clausewitzova definice války: „Aktu 
násilí za účelem donucení našeho oponenta naplnit naši vůli,”189 a to navzdory faktu, že 
oficiální definice neexistuje. Jelikož kodifikace MHP však znamenala, že po oficiálním 
vstupu do války musela být dodržována dotyčná pravidla MHP režimu, vyhlašování války 
přestalo být dodržováno, a důsledkem toho ztratilo na významu.  
V současnosti je tak pojem válka nahrazován pojmem ozbrojený konflikt, i když 
ani jeho oficiální definici nikde nenajdeme. Nicméně Mezinárodní výbor červeného kříže 
(„International Committee of the Red Cross”, ICRC) jej definuje jako: „Uchýlení se k 
ozbrojeným silám jedním nebo vice státy”. 190 Mezinárodní právní asociace v roce 2005 
prohlásila, že existence ozbrojeného konfliktu závisí na naplnění minimálních kritérií, a 
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sice: „Existence ozbrojených organizovaných skupin zapojených do bojů určité 
intenzity.”191  
Konečně je také nutno rozlišit mezi ne-mezinárodním ozbrojeným konfliktem 
(„Non-International Armed Conflict“ NIAC)192, na které se MHP až na explicitní výjimky 
prakticky nevztahuje, a mezinárodním ozbrojeným konfliktem („International Armed 
Conflict“, IAC)193 pro které bylo MHP vytvořeno především. Ačkoli kvůli nedávnému 
vývoji zahrnujícímu jak rozšíření teroristických útoků, tak použití kybernetických zbraní, 
dochází poměrně často ke stírání hranice mezi NIAC a IAC. 
Nadto je třeba rozlišit pojem ozbrojeného útoku v jus ad bellum, kde je tento: „Akcí, 
která dává státům právo na odpověď dosahující úrovně předcházejícího užití síly 
protivníka“ a pojmu útok v MHP, kde je tento definován jako: „Jistá kategorie vojenských 
operací,” 194  a dále také jako: „Akt násilí proti protivníkovi, ať už v ofenzivě či 
v defenzivě.”195 Práce tedy používá termínu „ozbrojený útok“ v kontextu jus ad bello a 
termínu „útok“ v kontextu MHP. Nicméně v obou právních režimech se klade otázka, zda 
lze kybernetický útok považovat ať už za ozbrojený útok v jus ad bello či útok v MHP. 
Počátek MHP se datuje do druhé poloviny 19. století, kdy byla založena mezinárodní 
instituce dnes známá jako Mezinárodní výbor červeného kříže, která v roce 1864 přivedla 
16 zemí k podpisu První ženevské úmluvy o zlepšení osudu raněných a nemocných 
příslušníků ozbrojených sil v poli. Po Rusko-japonské válce v roce 1906 následovala 
Druhá ženevská úmluva vztahující se na členy námořních ozbrojených sil, v roce 1929 
byla podepsána Třetí ženevská úmluva o zacházení s válečnými zajatci, a konečně v roce 
1949 Čtvrtá ženevská úmluva vztahující se na civilisty, přičemž zároveň došlo také 
k významné revizi úmluv předcházejících. Součást Ženevských konvencí tvoří také tři 
Dodatkové protokoly a tři Společné články, které definovaly pole působnosti úmluv, 
tzv. ženevského práva, které se věnuje především ochraně osob v průběhu ozbrojených 
konfliktů. Pravidla vedení ozbrojených konfliktů, způsobů a prostředků v nich použitých 
upravuje tzv. haagské právo, jehož původním a hlavním pramenem je První a Druhá 
Haagská úmluva z roku 1899, respektive 1907.  
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Obecné zásady MHP vycházejí z úsilí zamezit tzv. absolutní válce, jež by mohla být 
pro lidstvo fatální, a jsou tak považovány za součást jus cogens. Obecné zásady se tak 
dělí do kategorie zakazující určité dopady útoků, a sice zákaz zbytečného utrpení, zásada 
vojenské nezbytnosti, proporcionality a nediskriminace, a kategorie, která stanovuje 
určité chování jako například zásada předběžné opatrnosti. Dále existují specifické 
zásady MHP týkající se konkrétních typů zbraní či způsobu vedení konfliktu. 
2. Kybernetické zbraně, kybernetická válka a MHP rámec 
Aby bylo možno zodpovědět otázku, zda je možné kybernetický útok považovat za 
útok a kybernetickou válku za ozbrojený konflikt, je v prvé řadě nutné pochopit 
fungování kybernetických zbraní. 
Ačkoliv opět chybí oficiálně přijatá definice kybernetické války, tato práce vychází 
z definice Richarda A. Clarke, kybernetického expera z USA: „Akce podniknuté 
národem-státem za účelem proniknutí do státních počítačů či sítí za účelem způsobení 
škody nebo přerušení procesů,” 196   a dále zužuje Clarkovu definici na útočné akce 
uskutečněné po počítačových sítí („computer network attacks“, CNA),197  za což jsou 
považovány: „Akce podniknuté za použití počítačových sítí za účelem porušení, 
poškození, znehodnocení nebo zničení informací uchovávaných na počítačích a 
počítačových sítí či počítačích a sítích zvlášť.”198  
CNA se tak dělí na syntaktické útoky, známé také jako malware, jež cílí na IT zařízení 
a sítě jako takové, a sémantické útoky, které cílí uživatele dat, a snaží se proto zabránit 
uživateli v přístupu k datům zprostředkovaných prostřednictvím napadnutých IT 
zařízení. CNA se mohou dělit podle typu útoku, který způsobují, nebo podle druhu 
malwaru, do kterého spadají.199   
Pro účely práce nejdůležitějšími útoky jsou DoS útoky („Denial-of-Service“, DoS), 
které se nacházejí na rozhraní syntaktických a sémantických útoků, podle toho, zda usilují 
také o poškození či zničení informace, nebo pouze o její znepřístupnění po určitou dobu; 
dále pak trojští koni, kteří se typicky vydávají za jiný program na počítačovém zařízení, 
přičemž zároveň monitorují uživatelovu aktivitu, či do ní dokonce zasahují; a 
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v neposlední řadě také tzv. backdoor malwary, které umožňují obejít běžné autentizační 
metody spočívající v zadávání kódů a hesel a zanechat napadené zařízení „otevřené“ pro 
původce malwaru. 
Mezi nejznámější akce, které poodhalily sílu CNA útoků jakož i možnou cestu 
národní obrany, kterou se státní entity v současnosti vydávají, bezesporu patřil útok 
provedený malwarem Stuxnet oficiálně odhalený v červnu 2010, jež působil na Blízkém 
východě a dokázal zničit či minimálně odstavit část iránského vládního programu; a série 
DoS útoků ruských hackerů na oficiální webové stránky mnoha předních estonských jak 
vládních, tak soukromých aktérů, včetně největších estonských bank a mediálních 
společností, provedených v květnu 2007.  
Dále během několika méně známých útoků, které pravděpodobně pocházely od 
státních entit a byly mířené na oficiální entity jiného státu, došlo k hromadným 
odposlechům nejen aktivit provozovaných na daných sítích či počítačích, ale také 
fyzických aktivit v bezprostřední blízkosti daných zařízení, získání přístupů do 
bankovních účtů, interních počítačových sítí a softwarů ovládajících provoz inženýrských 
sítí včetně elektráren, elektrických rozvodů a přehrad, jakož i interních systémů vládních 
úřadů, ministerstev a zastupitelských úřadů v zahraničí. 
Navzdory těmto nebezpečím, mezinárodní společenství stejně jako mnoho 
významných expertů na MHP se buďto ke vztahu MHP a kybernetické války nevyjadřuje 
nebo se k ní staví skepticky. Nicméně ICRC již v roce 2011 vydal prohlášení, ve kterém 
uvádí, že CNA by mohly být kvalifikovány jako útoky ve smyslu MHP200 a že: „Fakt, že 
nevedou k fyzické destrukci napadeného objektu je irelevantní.”201   
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3. Nevýhody aplikace současných právních rámců válečného práva na 
kybernetickou válku  
Vzhledem k tomu, že současný MHP rámec je poměrně dobře rozvinutý, tak je 
logické, že se v případě, kdy se vyskytne nová sféra, která spadá do MHP, aplikace 
metodou interpretace nabízí asi jako vůbec první možné řešení problému právní úpravy 
této nové sféry. Nicméně tato kapitola si klade za cíl osvětlit, proč metoda interpretace 
není nejefektivnějším řešením, a to zaprvé poukázáním na její obecné nedostatky, a za 
druhé na její konkrétní nedostatky v konfrontaci s kybernetickým prostorem.  
Prvním závažným obecným nedostatkem metody interpretace je nedostatečná úroveň 
legitimity subjektů, které by měly interpretaci provádět, a s tím spojený následný 
nedostatek respektu a dodržování nově ustanovených pravidel vyplývajících ze závěrů 
interpretačních subjektů. Tento nedostatek představuje již dnes reálný problém předních 
mezinárodních soudních institucí, jelikož mnohé státy dlouhodobě oponují ideji globálně 
univerzální jurisdikce, a to i v případech závažných porušení MHP.202 Například co se 
týče mezinárodních sporů řešenými Mezinárodním soudním dvorem (MSD), Spojené 
státy americké se stáhly z obecné jurisdikce této instituce v roce 1986, a sice v reakci na 
vydání rozsudku ve věci Nikaragua vs. Spojené státy americké. Nicméně i v případech, 
kdy státy obecnou jurisdikci Mezinárodního soudního dvora respektují, je vynutitelnost 
rozsudků MSD velmi zdlouhavá a obtížná, neboť Dvůr sám vynucovací pravomoc nemá 
a je odkázán na Radu bezpečnosti OSN. 
Co se týče Mezinárodního trestního soudu (MTS) ustanoveného Romským statutem, 
jeho jurisdikce je velice omezená, neboť mnohé státy včetně předních mocností jako 
USA, Rusko, Čína, Indie či Saudská Arábie tento zakládající dokument ani 
neratifikovaly. Pokud největší mocnosti odmítly uznat rozhodovací pravomoc 
mezinárodní soudní instituce v případě, kdy je právní rámec definující její působnost 
dobře znám a předem konsensuálně dohodnut, je spíše nerealistické předpokládat, že by 
podobné mezinárodní instituci byla udělena nejen rozhodovací pravomoc, ale také 
pravomoc interpretační tak silná, že by se překrývala s pravomocí tvořit právní normy 
nové, což by byla realita v případě, že by jí byla svěřena pravomoc interpretovat MHP 
normy v kontextu kybernetické války a zbraně.  
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V tomto případě je tedy ještě nereálnější se domnívat, že by interpretaci mohly 
provádět instituce disponující ještě menší kolektivní mezinárodní legitimitou jako 
například právní experti a vědci, což dosvědčuje příklad Tallinnského manuálu. Ten, 
jakožto produkt skupiny expertů svolané Severoatlantickou aliancí (NATO), bohužel 
postrádá celosvětovou legitimitu, neboť nečlenské státy NATO mohou a budou jeho 
závěry vždycky napadat jako politicky motivované. Nadto Tallinnský manuál při 
pečlivém čtení přináší spíše více otázek než odpovědí, čehož si je vědom i iniciátor jeho 
vzniku – NATO, které již připravuje s obdobnou skupinou expertů Tallinnský manuál 
2.0.  
Další problém metody interpretace spočívá více v jeho technickém rázu – jedná se o 
samotnou klasifikaci kybernetických zbraní. Jelikož vojenské objekty využívají pro 
komunikaci civilní počítačové sítě, kybernetické zbraně by tak teoreticky mohly být 
považovány za tzv. slepé zbraně, které jsou „neschopny rozlišovat mezi civilisty a 
vojenskými objekty,“ 203  a jako takové být de facto zakázány podobně jako jaderné 
zbraně. 204  S tím souvisí také potřeba vyřešit otázky související s principem 
proporcionality, a sice za jakých podmínek je možné na kybernetické zbraně odpovědět 
kinetickými útoky a naopak. I tady je nepravděpodobné, že by zodpovězení těchto otázek 
bylo svěřeno komukoliv jinému než mezinárodnímu společenství jako celku. 
4. Základní nekompatibilita mezi současnou úpravou MHP a 
kybernetickou válkou a zbraněmi: anonymita, teritorialita a čas  
Hlavní překážka aplikovatelnosti současné úpravy MHP na kybernetickou válku a 
zbraně spočívá ve třech fakticky naprosto odlišných pojetí základních dimenzí 
ozbrojeného konfliktu – původu, teritoriality a času. Tato odlišná pojetí spočívají 
konkrétně v nežádoucímu autorství respektive anonymitě útoků, pojetí lokace a teritoria 
ozbrojeného konfliktu, a konečně rychlosti útoku v kontextu kybernetického konfliktu a 
ozbrojeného konfliktu kinetického, ať už se tento odehrává na souši, ve vzduchu či na 
moři. 
Co se týče autorství útoků, respektive anonymity jejich autorů, tu je v případě 
kinetických útoků velice obtížné si zachovat, a to především v dlouhodobém hledisku. 
Nicméně v případě útoků kybernetickými zbraněmi může být anonymita útočníků 
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zachována i při opakovaných útocích téměř navěky, jelikož je v praxi jen velice obtížné 
zjistit odkud přesně byl útok zahájen. Navíc, i když je odhaleno zapojení konkrétních 
útočníků či útočníků konkrétní národnosti do kybernetického útoku, je velmi těžké těmto 
dokázat, že útoky provedli na objednávku či v přímém nasazení pro státní aktéry, a 
nikoliv v jejich soukromém zájmu, popřípadě v rámci nestátní organizované zločinecké 
skupiny, jako tomu bylo například při kybernetických útocích v Estonsku.  
S anonymitou útočníků souvisí také zásada ochrany civilistů v MHP, která je ve 
své aktuální podobě na kybernetické útočníky prakticky neaplikovatelná, neboť pokud by 
již lokace útočníků byla přesně odhalena (původce nakažených USB disků, lokace 
skutečné IP adresy), což je už i tak v praxi téměř nemožné, útočník používající 
kybernetických zbraní se může vždycky vydávat za civilistu, jehož počítač byl k útokům 
zneužit prostřednictvím backdoor malwarů. Navíc kybernetické útoky mohou být na 
dálku řízeny i z počítačů opravdových civilistů, a tím je tak ohrozit.  
Co se týče teritoriálního aspektu kybernetických útoků, ten je také naprosto 
nesrovnatelný s pojetím teritoria a lokalizace při kinetických útocích. Zaprvé, v případě 
kybernetických útoků je takřka nemožné teritorium ozbrojeného konfliktu jakkoli fyzicky 
vymezit či omezit, neboť způsob šíření kybernetických zbraní je srovnatelný s šířením 
zbraní chemických či biologických, ale na ještě větším rozsahu, navíc opět s takřka 
nevystopovatelným epicentrem útoku. Vedle toho kybernetické zbraně dosahují svých 
cílů mnohdy za užití civilních počítačových sítí, ale mohou jich dosahovat také 
prostřednictvím kybernetických útoků mířených či postihujících civilisty, jako v případě 
zasažení elektrické sítě či v případě DoS útoků. 
Dalším problémem spojeným s teritorialitou útoků je, jestli má stát, jehož sítěmi útok 
pouze prochází, právo či povinnost takovému kybernetickému útoku zamezit, a pokud 
ano, tak jestli i v případě,  že by tomu tak bylo na úkor domácích uživatelů dané sítě.  
Nadto, dokonce i v případě kybernetických útoků lze občas lokalizovat data, jelikož 
datová úložiště jsou ve skutečnosti přece jen relativně snadno lokalizovatelné materiální 
objekty, což je případ především hromadných datových úložišť, které mohou teoreticky 
sloužit jako skladiště kybernetických zbraní. I v tomto případě se nabízí otázka, zda má 
stát, na jehož území se dané úložiště nachází, právo anebo dokonce povinnost toto úložiště 
jakkoliv sledovat, zasahovat do něj či jej dokonce fakticky modifikovat, a současně opět 
také otázka proporcionality takovéhoto eventuálního práva v porovnání s právy běžných 




Hledisko teritoriality se tak v mnohém podobá také NIACu v kontextu teroristických 
útoků, jejichž cíl jakož i směr šíření jsou opět nepředvídatelné. 
Konečně, co se týče otázky pojetí času, to úzce souvisí s dvěma předcházejícím body: 
díky rychlosti útoků je schopnost zasáhnout obrovské teritorium maximalizována, a 
zároveň schopnost útočníka zachovat si anonymitu je významně zesílena faktem, že 
ačkoliv kybernetický útok může působit takřka okamžitě, o jeho existenci se napadený 
nemusí dozvědět hned v době útoku, ale až daleko později, jelikož ty nejvíce 
sofistikované CNA jsou navrženy tak, aby nebyly hostitelem či obětí zaznamenány a 
obsahují i velmi rozvinuté způsoby maskování se jako neškodný software. 
Nadto, absence povědomí o proběhlém útoku znemožňuje dalším entitám, které by 
mohly představovat potencionální cíl dalších útoků tyto efektivně předvídat. Například, 
pokud je napadena elektrárna soukromé společnosti, ta ve skutečnosti ne vždycky své 
souputníky či vládní entity o proběhlém útoku informuje, a to z důvodu obavy o svoji 
pověst nebo postavení na trhu. Tím pádem jsou ty normy MHP, kde hraje pojem nezbytné 
nutnosti či neodkladnosti důležitou roli, ohroženy na významu. S tím také souvisí zákaz 
nepřiměřeně závažného útoku ustanoveného v čl. 51 (5) (b) a čl. 57 Dodatkového 
protokolu I, jakož i zákaz neurčitých útoků stanového v čl. 51 (4) Dodatkového protokolu 
I, do jejichž rámců by CNA mohly snadno spadat.  
5. Nezbytné části nové úmluvy o kybernetické válce  
Na rozdíl od předchozích kapitol, které analyzovaly a kriticky hodnotily současnou 
MHP úpravu, poslední pátá kapitola práce zaujímá hledisko de lege ferenda a snaží se 
navrhnout základní body, které by nová úmluva o kybernetické válce, jejíž nezbytnost 
dosvědčily předcházející kapitoly, měla obsahovat.  
Co se týče formální stránky, nová úmluva by se řídila standardně Vídeňskou úmluvou 
o smluvním právu z roku 1969. Strany úmluvy by byly definovány tzv. Vídeňskou 
formulí a celý smluvní proces by byl koordinován OSN.  
Co do obsahu nové úmluvy, ten by měl zcela jistě zahrnovat novou definici pojmu 
útok v kontextu kybernetické války a zbraní včetně specifikace pojmu „násilí“, jež má 
podle čl. 49 (1) Dodatkového protokolu I pro definici útoku ve stávající MHP úpravě 
postavení sine qua non prvku. Kybernetické útoky by tak mohly být definovány jako 
kybernetické operace, ať ofenzivní či defenzivní povahy, které, pokud provedeny, mají 




zraněním a nebo k vážné škodě nebo zničení předmětů nezbytných pro přežití civilního 
obyvatelstva včetně veřejné infrastruktury a jejích sítí.  
Dále by pak měly být specifikovány hlavní zásady MHP v kybernetickém kontextu, 
pozornost by se samozřejmě měla soustředit na ty, které by v daném případě vzbuzovaly 
nejvíc nejasností. Například zásada rozlišování by měla být v novém kontextu zcela 
redefinována, nicméně by měla zůstat zachována, a to i navzdory právním expertům 
volajícím po upuštění od této zásady205.  
Podobně by mělo dojít k přehodnocení zásady zákazu cílení civilistů, a sice ve smyslu 
její konkretizace nejen vzhledem ke kybernetickým útočníkům, ale především k civilním 
počítačovým sítím a jejím uživatelům. Úmluva by tak mohla považovat všechny civilisty, 
kteří aktivně a vědomě participují na kybernetických útocích za jedince, které je možno 
legitimně považovat za cíl.  
Zároveň by také měla být zodpovězena otázka, zda soukromé entity, jejichž existence 
či činnost jsou nezbytné pro řádný chod země, mohly profitovat ze zvláštního ochranného 
statusu podobně jako entity spravující základní infrastrukturu, či nikoliv.  
Dále by měla být adresována také zásada neutrality, která má v kybernetickém 
kontextu obzvlášť komplexní povahu, a to zejména s ohledem na země, na jejichž území 
se nacházejí či jež spravují datové sítě.  
Vedle toho by měla být specifikována rovněž i zásada proporcionality, jež vyžaduje, 
anticipovat dopady útoků vzhledem k možným zraněním a ztrátě na životech a škodách 
na civilních objektech tak, aby tyto nepřesáhly očekávané a přímé vojenské zisky 
vyvolané útokem. V opačném případě se totiž jedná o neurčité útoky, jejichž výkon 
současný MHP rámec nedovoluje.  
Konečně by úmluva měla redefinovat pojem špionáže v kybernetickém kontextu, 
neboť techniky, které jsou podle aktuální pravidel hodnoceny nikoliv jako útok, nýbrž 
jako špionáž, by v nevídaně vysokém měřítku a frekvenci, jež jsou umožněny právě 
kybernetickými zbraněmi, teoreticky mohly být hodnoceny jako útok ve smyslu MHP. 
Celkově by se tak členové mezinárodního společenství měli dohodnout na konkrétním 
společném pojetí útoků, ozbrojených konfliktů a pojetí zbraní a násilí platném 
v případě kybernetické války, jež v současnosti představuje jednu z nejdynamičtěji se 
rozvíjejících oblastí právního vakua panujícího v mezinárodním humanitárním právu, a 
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to raději dříve, než se tak bude muset stát a posteriori – po proběhnutí kybernetických 
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ABSTRAKT  
Inspirována rostoucím počtem odhalených kybernetických útoků mířených na 
veřejné a vládní zařízení a instituce, tato diplomová práce si klade za cíl poodhalit stěžejní 
význam kybernetické války a kybernetických zbraní, poukázat na kritické právní vakuum, 
které v současnosti panuje v oblasti aktuálně platné úpravy mezinárodního humanitárního 
práva, a navrhnout doplnění tohoto rámce o MHP úmluvě, jež by regulovala použití 
kybernetických zbraní v mezinárodních ozbrojených konfliktech. 
Aby práce mohla poskytnout dobře strukturované a relevantní argumenty na podporu 
své hlavní teze, využívá metod kvalitativní analýzy současného MHP rámce, včetně 
mezinárodních smluv, zvykového práva a výstupních materiálů hlavních institucí 
věnovaných mezinárodní spravedlnosti spolu s prací předních autorů a  odborníků 
v oblastech MHP a kybernetické bezpečnosti. 
Práce se skládá z pěti hlavních kapitol. První kapitola představuje základní principy 
válečného práva, včetně jeho historie, teorie a rozvoje, a zaměřuje se na jeden z jeho tří 
hlavních režimů - mezinárodní humanitární právo. 
Druhá část je věnována problematice kybernetické války a zbraní, definuje je jako 
počítačové útoky, vysvětluje jejich klasifikační systém, analyzuje jejich účinky a uvádí 
skutečné příklady takovýchto útoků z praxe.  
Třetí kapitola je zaměřena na problematiku současného právního vakua MHP ve 
vztahu ke kybernetické válce a přináší kritickou analýzu hlavních nevýhod současně 
dostupných možných řešení tohoto vakua na základě současného MHP rámce. 
Čtvrtá část představuje kritické rozdíly mezi tradiční kinetickou válkou a zbraněmi a 
válkou kybernetickou a jejími nástroji a zbraněmi a snaží se vysvětlit, proč současný 
MHP rámec skutečně není možno efektivně aplikovat na kybernetickou válku v praxi. 
Poslední část práce navrhuje řešení otázky neslučitelnosti stávající MHP úpravy 
s kybernetickou válkou v podobě nové MHP úmluvy pro kybernetickou válku a poskytuje 
návrh jejích hlavních bodů tak, aby budoucí kybernetické konflikty mohly být 








Regarding the increasing number of revealed cyber-attacks aimed at public facilities 
including the governmental ones by who seems to be other state actors, this thesis aims  
to reveal the major importance of cyber warfare, point out the fatal vacuum regarding the 
IHL framework currently in force and suggests its completion by a new IHL convention, 
which would regulate cyberwarfare in International Armed Conflicts.  
In order to provide a well-structured and pertinent arguments to support its main 
points, the thesis uses methods of qualitative analysis of the current IHL sources including 
international treaties, customary law and work of the main institutions of international 
justice along with work of judicial scholars and cyber experts. 
The work contains five main chapters. The first chapter presents the underlining 
principles of Laws of Wars, including its theory, history and development; and focuses 
on one of its three main regimes – the International Humanitarian Law.  
The second part is dedicated to the topic of cyber warfare, defines its scope as 
computer network attacks, explains their classification system, analyses their effects and 
provides examples of such attacks.  
The third chapter focuses on the issue of the current legal vacuum in relation to cyber 
warfare and delivers a critical analysis of the most severe drawbacks to possible solutions 
of the vacuum. 
The fourth part presents the insurmountable differences between the traditional 
kinetic warfare and cyber warfare and explains why these differences make the current 
IHL framework truly incompatible with cyber warfare in practice.  
The last part of the thesis suggests a solution to the issue of incompatibility of the 
current IHL provisions and cyber warfare in a form of a new IHL treaty dedicated to cyber 
warfare and provides a draft of its main points so that future cyber conflicts can be 
evaluated and judged according to the updated IHL framework,  which would  correspond  
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